












The American University, Washington, D, C.
Title: The Hole of -the Navy in the Formulation of
United States Foreign Policy
Author: Thomas f(. Kinnebrew
An examination of the means by which the Navy contri-
butions are made during the formulation of foreign policy and
of the- actions taken by the Navy to prepare its officers for
this effort. The Organizational channels used receive primary
attention. The under -graduate and post-graduate education
programs of the wavy are discussed, A survey of the contents
of the United ot.ates IJaVjal Injryjtute, Proceedings evaluate
s
the level of interest of the naval officer corps in foreign
po 1 j cy an d natio n al sec ar i ty policy.

Till: ROLE OF THE NAVY IN THE FORMULATION OF




Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS















Because the author of this paper is a naval officer on
active duty, it may be worthwhile to point out--and to empha-
size, if need be—thai the information, opinions, findings,
and conclusions of this work are the author's own except where
specifically attributed to another. The work does not neces-
sarily represent the position of the Navy Department or of any
of the officers or officials with whom it was discussed during
its preparation. It is the product of the author and he alone
is responsible for its content.
The long list of individuals to whom the author is
indebted for assistance is headed by Professor Durward V.
bandifer of the American University and the late Dean Charles
0. Lerche, also of the American University. Their teeching
inspired his initial interest in this subject; their guidance
assisted materially in the development of the final product.
A heartfelt vote of thanks is also due the author's
shipmates in U.d.S. CQUiiTN£Y (DE-1021), who provided continuing
and meaningful encouragement end support during the drafting




I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
. . . .
II. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NAVY THROUGH
The Early Years
Expansionism arid a Growing Navy-
World War I
Post-Y/ar Disarmament Conferences
Army a.nd Navy Relationship.
. .
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Years
Planning for Post-V/ar Years
. .
Summary
III. POST-WAR ORGANIZATION AND REORGANI
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The First Moves toward Reorganizat
The National Security Act of 194
The 1949 Amendments'
The Korean .Var Period
. , , .
The Reorganization Act of 195.3
The Chairman and the Chiefs
.












































. . ............ 85
V. THE NAVY 1 3 PREPARATION FOR ITS ROLE 8 7
Undergraduate Education 89
Post-Graduate Education ..... 93
Designation of Officers 123
Designation of Duty Assignments ...,..,., 123
Summary 124
VI. PRESENT NAVY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING .... 126
Examples of Navy Participation. ......... 126
The Naval Officers Involved ........... 130
The Secretary of Defense 132
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for




The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff .... 136
The Joint Staff ........... 136
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
. 140
The Chief of Naval Operations
.
141
Unified and International Commanders 143












I. The Educational Level of U.S. Naval Officers in
International Relations and Political Science. . . 131
II. Analysis of Content of All Articles in United
States Insti tute Proceedings 1 74
III. Analysis of Content of Lead Articles in United
States Institute Proceedings ... * 176
IV. Analysis of Subject of Books Reviewed in United-




1. Percent of All Articles Published in the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings on National Security Policy
and Foreign Policy . 175
2. Percent of Lead Articles Published in the U.S. Naval
Ins titute Pro ceedings on National Security Policy
and Foreign Policy 17?
3. Percent of Book Reviews Published in the U» S. Naval
Institute Proceedings on National Security Policy
find Foreign Policy , , 179

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
7/ith the advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinen-
tal delivery systems, the nature of warfare changed. This
change was compounded by the activity at the other end of
the spectrum of conflict, the wars by proxy waged by the
communists and called "wars of national liberation." These
changes came concommitantly with the emergence of the United
States as a super-power in world affairs. The task of
directing its efforts in the right direction and by the
right methods was particularly difficult for the United
States because this was the nation's first full-fledged
participation in international affairs in time of peace.
Another major change was the base upon which United
States foreign policy was formulated. In earlier years
rational security was the base upon which foreign policy
was built; presently, national security is the goal toward
which foreign policy must be directed.
At the same time, approximately, as the changes dis-
cussed above—and partly in response thereto~-there were
revolutionary changes wrought in the organizational struc-
ture of the United States military forces. As a result of
ail these changes, military advice and information are much
more pertinent in the formulation of foreign policy than

2was the case in the past. Furthermore, the channels through
which military advice is sought an 3 furnished have changed
remarkably.
Universal agreement on the role the military should
play in the formulation of foreign policy does not exist.
On the one ha.nd, the nation is warned by its President to
be alert for too much military influence. In his farewell
a.ddress President Eisenhower said:
In the councils of government, we must guard against
the unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought,
by the military-industrial complex. , . . Only an alert
and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper mesh-
ing of the huge industrial and military machinery of
defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that
security and liberty may prosper together.
On the other hand, when addressing the graduating
class at the United States Uaval Academy in June, 1961,
President Kennedy urged the midshipmen to be prepared to go
beyond the confines of purely military considerations in
decision making. He said:
You must know everything you can about military
po ; er and you must a.lso understand the limits of mili-
tary power. You must understand that few of the impor-
tant problems of our time have, in the final analysis,
been finally solved by military power. when I say that
officers of today must go far beyond the official cur-
riculum, I say it not because I do not believe in the
traditional relationship between the civilian and the
military, but you must be more than the servants of
national policy. You must be prepared to play a con-
structive role in the development of national policy,
a policy which protects our interests and our security
and the peace of the world.
Comparison of these two quotations reveals that they

3are not contradictory—although at first reading they may
appear to be. Each of the Presidents was addressing the same
problem; each no doubt believed the same facts to exist;
each sought approximately the same contribution from military
officers in the field of policy formulation. The fact that
the quotations appear contradictory is indicative of much of
the problem of investigating this field. The role of the
military in policy-making has not yet been clearly defined,
although it is more fully done now than at any previous time,
Because no one can cite chapter a.nd verse regarding the con-
tributions expected and the limitations placed on the mili-
tary in policy-making, great differences of opinion have
arisen as to what they should be.
Some of the problems incident to finding the proper
role for the military have been with us a long time. Others
are new.
Among the older problems still facing the nation is
the place of the military in a liberal state. Samuel P.
Huntington points out that the ideal liberal state does not
have a security function, it is presumed to exist in vacuo .
n The assumption of a state in a vacuum was particularly
relevant to American liberalism because for almost a century
American reality approximated the liberal image. The appli-
cability of the liberal assumption to the United States
settled it all the more firmly in the American mind and

4created problems all the more difficult to solve when the
vacuum began to break down." And. now, the vacuum has beer-
replaced by the pressure of international involvement and
conflict, and still the problem is not totally solved*
Civilian control of the military is an indispensable
element cf the American process of government. Considerable
concern has been expressed, increasingly so in recent years,
that military advisers are loosening the shackles, of civil-
ian control and marching off on their own paths in develop-
ing policy. Morris Janowitz notes, "The milita.ry profession
is criticized as carrying too much weight and influence in
the formulation of foreign policy, especially by over-
emphasizing the function of violence. As compared with that
of Gre-t Britain, our military force seems much too active
and outspoken as a legislative pressure group and as a 'pub-
lie relations' force." He concludes, however, that civil-
ian control of the military is intact and is acceptable to
the military, calling any imbalance in military contribu-
tions to politico-military affairs "the result of default
* Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State
(Cambridge, Kass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1957), p. 149.
2Morris Janowitz, The_ Professional Soldier (Glencoe,
111.: The Free Press of Glencoe, I960), p. 14.

2by civilian political leadership."
Hanson Baldwin, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy,
might be expected to be favorably disposed to the military.
He is, but he recognizes the necessity for constraints, "The
military must be honored but not extolled, allowed to in-
fluence but not to propagandize, have their place in govern-
ment but a place strictly circumscribed."
In an excellent work on this subject, The RpJLe. of
the Military in American Foreign Policy, the problem is
described quite well, "All in all, there ca,n be little
doubt but that the role of the American Military Establish-
ment in the formulation and execution of national policy
(as well as its wider impact on the society) represents an
important contemporary political and social problem. It is
also essentially a new problem, in part because traditional
American values and institutions in the field of civil-
military rel-tions have never before been so severely chal-
lenged." 5
The same authors have a hopeful outlook for solving
the problem. Addressing three basic aspects of the situation,
3Ibid.
, p. viii.
4Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In," Harper's
Magazine, 195:1171, December, 1947, p. 489.
^Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The, Role of
the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.
:
Boubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 2„

6they conclude that "vigorous and imaginative civilian lead-
ership, together with greater civilian and military self-
consciousness about the nature and limits of the foreign
policy ma.king role of the military establishment and its
professional officer personnel, should aid in the achieve-
ment of these fundamental goals: first, effective as well
as formal civilian control of the major foreign policies
and programs of the U.S.; second, more effective and eco-
nomic use of the skills ana resources of the military estab-
lishment in foreign policy making; and third, safe-guarding
the career-servant, non-partisan rolo of the military offi-
ccr in the American government."
E.S. Corwin has said, "The Constitution is an invita-
tion to struggle for the privilege of directing American
7foreign policy." This statement highlights the fact that
foreign policy is often made by those who aggressively set
forth and advance their convictions. When this situation is
considered along with the fact that "it is not possible to
draw a strict line between the development and formulation
of policies on the one hand and their execution and imple-
°Ibi£». P. 67.
7E.S. Corwin,
1 787-19^3 (New York: NYU Press, 1948J, p. 8C8.
G v/i The President : Office and Powers .

mentation on the other, " one can •understand that not only
is military advice needed in developing policy but military
leaders feel en obligation to make it available,, From that
point on, the distinction between making information and
a.dvice available and making policy itself is a question of
individual interpretation. This accounts in large measure
for the concern that is often expressed from both points of
view about military participation in policy marking. Some-
times it is alleged that the military implications are not
sufficiently considered in policy making. More often, it is
stated that military men have too much influence in the for-
mulation of policy.
There is little disagreement expressed that there
must be some military contribution to policy making, Alfred
Vagts quotes Senator Green as saying, "It is really nonsense
to discuss considering military matters apart from the dip-
9loraatic because the diplomatic fixes the objective." It is
equally nonsensical to consider diplomatic matters withoxit
considering the existence or lack of military pov/er required
to support the national policy and accomplish its objectives,
Americans have not always successfully amalgamated
°Sapin and Snyder, on,,, cit.
,
p. 40.
Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy (New York:
King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 117.

8military and diplomatic policies, strategies, and objec-
tives. We could accept as our own the failure laid at the
feet of Hitler's Germany by one of his military leaders,
General Kleist, "Our mistake was to think that a military
success would solve political problems. Indeed, under the
Nazis we tended to reverse Clausewitz's dictum and to regard
peace as a continuation of war."
Although the United States did not make the most,
diplomatically, of the power it held during and following
World War II, it now seems to have become aware more than
ever of the necessity for subordinating military objectives
to longer range political ones. Secretary of Defense James
Forrestal said, "The great mistakes were node during the war
because of American failure to realize that military and
political action had to go hand in hand. . . . Both the
11
British and the Russians realize this fact.
The nature of the Cold War has contributed to
increasing the lia.ison and cooperation recuired between
military men and statesmen. Another influence has been the
changing weaponry of the major powers, Janowitz points out,
"Because the more advanced technology of war lies at the
10B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New
York: Berkley Publishing Corp,, 1958), p. 162.
llWalter Millis (ed,), The Forrestal Diaries (Hew
York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 436.

9source of the increased political power of the military-
elite, all major industrialized powers are experiencing this
trend toward great political influence by military leaders."-1- 2
It can be seen, therefore, that military considera-
tions are important in the whole spectrum of the nation's
foreign policy objectives, ranging from uncommitted nations'
needs to major powers' confrontations. What is not clear is
the manner in which these military considerations should be
introduced into the policy-making machinery. Carrying the
point a step further, what is the role of one part of "the
military" in this process? Specifically, what is the role
of one service, the Navy, in developing foreign policy? As
a look at the bibliography makes apparent, a substantial
amount of study has been directed toward the subject of
overall military participation in policy making. To the
best of the author's knowledge, no study has been focused on
the role of one service. This study, then, will examine the
role of the Navy in the development of foreign policy. A
brief treatment of the Navy's historical contributions will
be given, followed by a mere detailed examination of the
^Morris Janowitz, "Working Paper on The Professional
Soldier and Political Power" (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Bureau of
Government, Institute of Public Administration, University
of Michigan, 1952), p. 15. (Mimeographed.)
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organization through which much of the Navy's present con-
tribution is funneled-~the Department of Defense. This
study will also address the awareness and interest of the
officer corps in the problem and the preparations of the
Navy to train its officers to make a meaningful contribu-
tion to policy making*
The aim of this study is to determine what the Navy
does in formulating foreign policy and how the Navy prepares
itself to do this. It is imperative for the Navy and for
the nation that this preparation be adequate since an under-
standing of the objective is essential to selecting a proper
course of action for achieving that objective.
Morris Janowitz introduced The Profess ion al do Idler
by saying, "The military faces a crisis as a profession:
How can it organize itself to meet its multiple functions of
strategic deterrence, limited warfare, and enlarged politico-
13
military responsibility?" This study will examine the way
in which the Navy is maeting a part of this crisis.
12Janowitz, The Profe ssional Soldier , ?. vii.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NAVY
THROUGH WORLD WAR II
An examination of the role of the Navy in making for-
eign policy in earlier years should provide a bettor appre-
ciation and understanding of the Navy's present role.
Accordingly, this chapter considers the part played by offi-
cers of the Navy from the founding of the nation until the
end of World War II.
I. THE EARLY YEARS
In the first century of the nation's life, there were
frequent requirements for naval officers to engage in policy-
making. Such a.ction usually took place on the scene and at
the time a policy decision was required. Many times there
were no other accredited representatives of the United States
present, and the senior naval officer was forced to decide
on a course of action and carry it out. With a knowledge of
the broad policies of the government, this v/a.s usually a
matter of selecting one of the several available options that
fell within the broad parameters of the accepted policy--as
the officer at the scene understood the policy.
In this way, by the end of the 7/ar of 1812, officers
of the Unjted States Navy had conducted negotiations with
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representatives of trance, Morocco, and Algiers. These
were substantive negotiations, addressing subjects of con-
siderable import. Minor negotiations with other nations had
also been conducted by naval officers.
In the nineteenth cent\*ry, naval officers concluded
treaties with Hawaii, Japan, Korea, and. Samoa. Activities
such as these resulted in there being a number of navy
planners who had worked on issues in which the interests of
p
the sailor and the diplomat tended to converge. The number
of naval officers so trained has varied in the intervening
years, but the hard core of ability in this field has never
been totally lost.
II. EXPANSIONISM AND A GROWING NAVY
In the second half of the nineteenth century, and
especially following the V/ar .Between The States, the place
of the Navy in the national structure began to change. This
change brought with it an alteration of the role of the ser-
vice in foreign policy matters.
The inconclusive battle at Hampton Roads, Virginia,
in 1352 between the U.S.S. MONITOR and the C.S.S. VIRGINIA
1 John W, Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and





(ex-MERRIMAC) sounded the death knell for wooden warships of
the line. The transition to steel hulls had begun, and the
shift from wooden to steel hulls had far-ranging ramifica-
tions. Not the least of these in the United States was the
fact that American industry had gained a much greater inter-
3
est in the market for its product provided by the Navy.
Industry then emerged as an active lobbyist and propagandist
4
for American naval expansion.
This condition grew along with the first rumblings of
overseas expansionism. Reinforcing each other, they com~
bined to create a favorable climate for naval growth and for
greater influence by the Navy on policy. This view was
reflected by the report of the Secretary of the Navy, Kich-
ard 7/. Thompson, in 1877: "Without foreign commerce we must
sink into inferiority; and without a Navy amply sufficient
for this purpose, all the profits of our surplus productions
will be transferred from the coffers of our own to those of
foreign governments.
This mood was by no means uniform throughout the
nation, and it met with open hostility in many areas. Num-
sArthur A. Ekireh, Jr., The Civilian and the Milijtary,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 127.
4Ibid




bers of Congressmen believed a large navy to be a useless
luxury and a. provocation to war, Such critics pointed out
that the nation had no colonies to protect and that the
national economy could be largely supplied and utilized by
the people of the United States without recourse to foreign
involvement in trade or otherwise.
The national policy was no doubt greatly affected by
the writings of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan of the U.S.
Navy, Although history remembers Mahan as more theorist
than activist, he tool: a. vigorous role in circulating his
theories and beliefs. Captain Mahan wa.s a member of the pop-
ular school of thought that urged a policy of expansionism.
A sizeable and influential number of American statesmen,
including Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, were
7
supporters of this doctrine.
There can be little doubt that the existence of a
capable navy and the prevalence of expansionistic feeling in
the nation contributed to American involvement in the war
with SpaJ.n in the closing years of the century.
The post—war atmosphere of victory and the mood of
expansionism affected the United States remarkably-.-perhaps
more so than it did other nations „ It is, therefore, not
surprising to find the American position a.t the Hague Con-
6
l0Lid t , P. 125
7IMd.i ?• 127 »
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ference in 1898 dominated by a nationalistic, military point
of view. Captain Mahan, United States Navy, was a member of
the United States delegation. He made clear that the United
States would refuse to consider the question of naval disarma-
Q
raent and did not intend to reduce its military resources*
Another indication of increasing national interest in
the Navy was the birth of the United States Navy League in
1903, This organization has been described as the Navy's
strong right arm in the civilian community. It has also
9
been referred to as a propaganda organization. The Navy
League, which, is still today a large, effective body, was
modeled after similar groups already existing in Europe. It
served to unite groups interested in encouraging legislation
for a strong navy and became a powerful lobbyist for naval
forces.
Criticism has been leveled against the military
leaders of the nation for their lack of political expertise
and their shortcomings in dealing with foreign problems from
the turn of 'the century until the First V/orld War, It should
be noted that this lack of knowledge and foresight, which
probably existed as claimed, was not a peculiarly military
inability but was in tune with the civilian thinking of the
times, Morris Janowitz says, n It is misleading to claim
8Ibid ., p, 137. 9Ibid «. p. 1^5.
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that the source of the difficulty was an un~political atti-
tude on the part of the military; it is more accurate to
point out that their political horizons were limited, and
reflected the interests of civilian society.""
III. WRIT) WAR I
The outbrea.k of war in Europe in 1914 sent shock
waves across the Atlantic that struck at all levels of the
American electorate. Again, as in the days of George vVash-
ington, foreign policy became a. principal and continuing
concern of the people and the government. This condition
was demonstrated in the election campaign of 1916, In the
introduction to Alexander DeConde's book, Paul H, Clyde
says, "When in 191.6 Americans re-elected a. President because
•He kept us out of war! ' they subscribed, doubtless without
so intending, to a diplomatic revolution without precedent
in the history of democratic government." Foreign policy
had become a subject of widespread importance and interest
to Americans of all walks of life.
Concurrently with the presidential campaign of 1916,
lOMorris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe,
111.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 287.
1
1
Ar tbur De C ond e ( e d . ) , Isolation and Security




Congress engaged in prolonged and bitter debate on the admin-
istration's five-year naval building program. Although it
was an election year, this subject would have provoked
strong feelings on its own merit at any time. It was a pro-
gram without precedent, compressing a five year ship-
building program into three years. Some Congressmen fought
the bill, protesting that it provided for a navy far beyond
the legitimate defense needs of the nation. In fact, the
program was designed to give the United States a navy second
only to Great Britain's, which at that time served as the
yardstick by which international naval might was measured.
The Navy League and biisiness interests were charged by some
Congressmen with exerting strong pressure for passage of the
bill. Despite the strength of the opposition, the building
program became law with the passage of the Naval Act of
August 29, 1916.
IV. POST-'/AH DISARMAMENT CONFERENCES
After the Armistice, memories of the horrors of the
First .Yorld V/ar gave renewed impetus to the movement for
disarmament, (This term is used here as it was used at the
time* In present terminology, the movement would be called
arms control rather tha.n disa.rma.ment
. ) The disarmament
movement ha.d greater applicability to the navy of the 1920s
than to the army. The United States Army that ha.d fought in

18
World War I was being demobilized, and proposals for univer-
sal military training had been defeated. America's stake
in the Washington Conference of 1922 was centered on its
12
naval forces.
The Washington Conference, which was initiated by the
United States, was the legitimate offspring of the earlier
Hague Conference. Anti-militarism was the touchstone of
policy at this conference with the U.S. Secretary of State
attempting to reconcile an active foreign policy with a
minimal military force. At this time the Navy had a General
Board, which was comprised of senior admirals who studied
and made recommendations regarding policy. The recommenda-
tions of the General Board were not followed at the Washing-
ton Conference of 1922. The admirals advised against dis-
cussing the islands in the Pacific and completely opposed
any restrictions on fortifications. Nevertheless, Secretary
Hughes agreed to maintain the status quo of the island for-
tifications. His position, apparently, was based on infor-
mation from senators that funds for fortifications would not
13be appropriated anyway.





J. Chalmers Vinson, "Military Force and American
Policy, 1919-1959," Isolation and Security (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 195?"*), p. 60.
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of the Washington Conference in many respects, even though it
did provide for naval parity with Great Britain in heavy war-
ships. To counter the trend toward a de-emphasis of the
importance of naval power to the nation, the Navy Department
launched an intensive campaign in the spring of 1922 to gain
Congressional support for an expanded personnel program.
Support for the Navy's position came from numerous business
and patriotic organizations including the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, the National Chamber of Commerce, the
National Security League, the American Legion, and the Navy
League, One of the highlights of this campaign was the
1 A
annual celebration of Navy Lay, which began in 1922. c
Proponents of disarmament counterattacked* The Navy's
resistance to the Washington Conference results were strongly
criticised, and increased stature to this opposition was
given by Calvin Coolidge when he became President. Recog-
nizing continued popular interest in disarmament a.nd noting
Congressional attacks on naval appropriations, President




Navy professionals from all nations took a greater
part in the Geneva Conference of 1927 than they had in Wash-
ington in 1922 „ The basic ratio for ship strengths had been
l^Ekirch, on. cit
. ,
p. 209-210, 3 - 5 Ibid. , p. 211.
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decided at the latter; at Geneva, efforts were aimed at
providing for a more nearly just distribution. Since no
nation's concept of justice in this area agreed with any
other nation's, the conference produced no tangible results.
It is noteworthy that this conference, too, was held at
American instigation.
Secretary of State Henry L, Stimson headed the Ameri-
can delegation to the London Naval Conference of 1930
»
France and Italy declined to attend this conference, leaving
Great Britain, Japan, and the United States as participants,
The Americans made little progress at this conference, los-
ing ground to the British in the field of cruiser strength
and losing ground to the Japanese in overall ratio (changed
from 5-5-3 to 10-10-7 for Great Britain, the United States,
and Japan, respectively) and in submarine strengths » Naval
officers in the United States opposed the results of the
conference, but despite widespread criticism the Hoover
administration accepter the treaty.
The bitter debates that took place within the admin-
istration ori this treaty have not been made public. The
disparate views, and the vehemence with which they were
expressed in executive sessions, have not been ma.de known.
However, the fact that the Navy was vigorously opposing the
provisions of the treaty can be inferred from the actions of
the Secretary of State. In a radio address on June 12, 19-30;
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Secretary Stimson attacked his naval officer opponents, say-
ing, fi'They are handicapped by a kind of training which tends
to make men think of war as the only possible defense against
war .
The final conference in this series of naval disarma-
ment conferences took place in London in 1935-1936. When
Japanese demands for full parity were opposed by the United
States, Japa.n withdrew from the conference. This effectively
ended the effort of the conference although France, Great
Britain, and the United States signed a treaty on March 25,
1956. The treaty had so many "escalator clauses" as to be
virtually meaningless. American ship-building, which had
been re -born in 1934 under the leadership of President
1&;
^uoted by Ekirch, p_p. cit . , p. 216. This statement
indicates Mr. Stimson's skepticism and, usually, disagreement
with the opinions of naval officers. An insight into his
beliefs is offered by the following evaluation attributed
to him by McGeorge Eundy during the postwar Array-Navy dis-
putes; "Some of the Array-Navy troubles, in Stimson 5 s view,
grew mainly from tho peculiar psychology of the Navy Depart-
ment, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of
logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God,
Mahan was his prophet, and the United States Navy the only
true Church. The high priests of this Church were a group
of men to whom Stimson always referred as 'the Admirals. 1
These gentlemen were to him both anonymous and continuous;
he had met them in 1930 in discussions of the London Naval
Treaty; in 1940 and afterwards he found them still active
and still uncontrolled by either their Secretary or tho
President." From Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On
Active Servi ce In Peace and War (New York: Harper &
L~r o th ers , 1 948 ) , ~p". 506.
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Roosevelt and Congressman Carl Vinson, continued at an
accelerating pace from this time until the end of World War
II.
V. ARMY AND NAVY RELATIONSHIP
During the years of the ninetsen-twenties and nineteen-
thirties, the Army and Navy had continued their separate
existences. There was virtually no inter-service rivalry
other than in athletics. This situation is the more readily
understood with the recognition of the fact that separate
Appropriations Sub-committees for each service existed in the
Congress, and, therefore, the size of one service's budget was
not necessarily related to the other's. The annual budget
battle was not a zero sum game at that time.
Strategic planning was nevertheless beginning to
acquire a joint flavor in these two decades as the services
co-operated in this field through the Joint Board. This
organization was not empowered to force a dissenter to con-
form, however, so that its purpose was primarily advisory. 17
VI. THE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT YEARS
Navy and Army officers moved closer to the forefront
17Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and
the Political Holes of the Armed Services," American Politi -
cal Scie " n, 50:40, March, 1961,

23
in national policy-making with the ina.ugera.tion of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. Roosevelt has been accused,
and not without basis, of neglecting his cabinet officers
and placing inordinate reliance on the Chiefs of the mili-
tary services. No President before him had maintained such
intimate and constant consultation with his military
18
leaders. It was fortunate for the President and the
nation that the military chiefs proved to be well equipped
for this responsibility. In part this ability must be
attributed to the fact that, as ^amuel P. Huntington says,
"The progressive involvement of the United States in inter-
national politics by the 1930s caused the world of American
foreign relations to approximate the image which the mili-
19
tary had always painted of it."
It must not be inferred that President Roosevelt
unfailingly followed the advice of his military leaders,
however. In September, 1937, after war had been renewed in
China, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swenson urged that the
nation declare war. Roosevelt told his cabinet that he was
*a pacifist" and delayed the conflict with Japan—while the
18Alfred Yagts, Defense and Diplomacy (New York:
King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 518.
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State





U.S. shipyards continued building.
Another instance of FDR's restraint came in December,
1937, following the sinking of the U.S. 3. PANAY by Japanese
warplanes. The other President Roosevelt might have heeded
the recommendations of his advisors and declared war, but
FDR did not take any provocative action despite the support
given by his adviser Norman H. Davis and Assistant Secretary
of State '.Valton Moore to Admiral Leahy's proposal to prepare
21
the fleet for action at sea.
Admiral -Villiam Leahy was serving as the Chief of
Naval Gpera.tions at that time; later, he served as military
adviser to Roosevelt during 7/orld War II. The actions of
Admiral Leahy demonstrate the influence of the Navy in
policy-making during this period. In 1937, after FDR's
famous quarantine speech at Chicago, Admiral Leahy testified
before the Rouse Committee on Naval Affairs, appearing as
the spokesman for the President. Leahy stated, "The politi-
cal conditions in the world at this moment, both in Europe
and in the Far East, are far more threatening than at any
time since 1918, and no improvement is in sight. The major
conflict in China, has resulted in many grave incidents
20
'<Yilliam L. Neumann, "Ambiguity and Ambivalence in
Ideas of National Interest in Asia, " Isolation and S ecuri ty




involving the sovereign rights and interests of the United
States and other third powers. The civil war in Spain con-
tinues unabated and the threat of a general European con-
22
flict is ever present*
"
Such a statement showed a keen awareness of the
international political situation. It must be assumed that
the Admiral's opinions and advice carried weight in the
councils of policy makers despite his rejoinder to question-
ing by a member of the committee. when asked to discuss the
relation between the quarantine speech and the pending bill
for greater naval construction, Admiral Leahy replied th3t
the Usvy Department had nothing to do with policy and that
23he did not know what future policy might be.
Congressional debate on the naval construction bill
of 1938 proved to be a forum for discussing foreign policy.
Some Congressmen feared thr. t the nation was inexorably mov-
ing toward war and used the debate to give voice to their
fears. Congressman Maverick of Texas declared on the floor
of the House that the admirals of the Navy were directing
the nation's foreign policy. Senator Johnson of Colorado
insisted that the Senate understand "we are not dealing
^ Charles A. Eeard, American Foreign Policy in the





with navies, we are dealing with American foreign policy."
Senator Walsh stated his -understanding that the Navy had
taken the initiative in advancing the legislation and that
Admiral Leahy himself had approached the President on the
24
subject. Passages such as these illustrate the influence,
real or imagined, of the senior officers of the Navy on the
nation's foreign policy of the nineteen-thirties.
By executive order the President froze all Ja.panese
assets in the United States in July, 1941. This action was
taken despite opposition by the military leaders. Admiral
Stark and General Marshall opposed the issuance of the order
but the advice of Secretaries Morgenthau and Stimson pre-
vailed. Interestingly, ten days before the order was issued
the Army Staff's War Plans Division warned that an embargo
would possibly lead to an early war in the Pacific.
In the months preceding the American entry into fforld
War II, a War Council existed a.nd met with President Roose-
velt. Membership of the Council consisted of the President,
Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary
of the Navy Knox, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and the
24TJ.3, Congress, Congressional ftp cord, 75th Congress .
«LrJ± Session (7/ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1938), o. 776, 902-9C3, 1244-1245, 3274, 3350, 5519, 5525,





Chief of Naval Operations. The group met weekly in the
President's oval office, acting as a. clearing house and
forum for ideas and for addressing the problems then con-
fronting the nation. After the war began, the President dis-
continued his meetings with this group. As will be dis-
cussed shortly, the President's wartime advice came pre-
dominant iy from the military leaders.
The demands of World War II could not be met by
decision makers operating in the pre-war organizational
structure. The military answer to this problem was the
creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first meeting of
this body took place on February 9, 1942, and wr^s attended
by General Marshall of the Army, Admiral Xing of the Navy,
27
and General Arnold of the Army Air Corps.
A statutory basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff did
not exist until 1947 nor did a charter cf responsibility.
Admiral Leahy has noted, "I have heard that in some file
there is a chit or memorandum from Koosevelt, setting up
26 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell gull (New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1948) Volume II, p. 1079,
also Stimson and Bundy, ojd. eit . , p. 563.
2 7
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the JCS, but I never saw it."
The lack of boundaries on the role of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff provided an opportunity for their exercising consid-
erable influence on policy in many areas. The JCS soon
became not only the principal agency for Army -Navy-Air Corps
coordination but also a major contributor to policy decisions
in other areas. Admiral Leahy points out, "The absence of
any fixed charter of responsibility allowed great flexibility
in the JCS organization and enabled us to extend its activ-
ities to meet the cha.nging requirements of the war. The JCS
was an instrument of the Commander-in-Chief and was respon-
29
sible to him. 8
The emergence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a pri-
mary policy-making body did not go unopposed by the civilian
leaders within the administration. On two occasions Secre-
tary of the Navy Frank Knox threatened to resign because he
was not privy to discussions between the President and the
rzr.
Chief of Naval Operations. Secretary of War Stimson
encountered similar problems in his dealings with the Presi-
2877illiam D. Leahy, I Was There. (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 102.
29 Ibid.
2
°Paul Y, Hammond, "Decision-Making in Defense: The
Hole of Organisation. Effects of Structure on Policy," Pub-
lic Administration Review. 18:175, Summer, 1953.

29
dent, Stirris on says, "(W)hen Mr. Hoosevelt learned to like the
JCS, in 1942, he allowed himself to dispense with any general
SI
meetings on war policy."
The influence of the Secretary of State was equally
eroded. In his Memoirs , Cordell Hull writes, "After Pearl
Harbor 1 did not sit in on meetings concerned with military
matters. This was because the President did not invite me
to such meetings, I raised the question with him several
times. It seemed manifest to me that, in numerous instances,
the Secretary of State should sit in on the President's war
councils, particularly on those of a combined military and
diplomatic nature, for it was obvious that scarcely any
large-scale military operations could be undertaken that
r6Z
would not have diplomatic aspects,"
If Mr. Hull's contention is granted that large scale
military operations had diplomatic aspects~«and, indeed, it
seems beyond dispute—then it must be assumed that the diplo-
matic aspects were addressed by the President and his close
advisers only. The bulk of these close advisers were the
military leaders.
The degree to which the Secretary of State was by-
passed in policy is clearly evident in his almost plaintive
statement, "Mr. Roosevelt had not communicated to me the
sl Stimson, loc. c it. 32Hull, op_,_ pit. , p. 1109,
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decisions reached at Casablanca. As I have said before, he
did not include me in the conferences he held then and later
with Churchill, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek on the ground
that they were military discussions and did not concern the
State Department, '.Ye had asked Admiral Leahy for a copy of
the Casablanca agreement but had been told that no copy was
available for us,"
Secretary of War Stimson recognized the problem of
the State Department, "The military interest could not of it-
self be wholly determinant; it was not proper that such
questions should be decided by the JCS, as the members of
54
that body well understood."
Despite the opposition of the Presidential advisers
to his primary reliance on the military leaders, there is no
evidence to indicate that President Roosevelt significantly
deviated from this procedure. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff exerted great influence through their work with the
British service chiefs. The United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the military leaders of Great Britain formed the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. The organization came into being
in Washington in early 1942 and was soon a fully developed
instrument for coordinating la.nd, sea, and air operations in
the war. Secretary of -Var Stimson says that the Combined
ggIbld
. . p. 1357. 34Stimson, op. cit, , p. 561,
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Chiefs of Staff "gradually developed an authority and influ-
ence exceeded only by the decisive meetings between the
35
President and the Prime Minister."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not provided with staff
support by statutory authority. By the end of 1942, however,
the JCS had created the Joint Strategic Survey Commission,
This body had members from each of the services, and these
members functioned primarily as representatives of their
parent services. The concept of a joint or general staff,
while well understood in the United States, had not yet been
accepted
Admiral William D, Leahy, United States Navy, was
perhaps the most influential of all the military leaders
involved in policy making. His position has been described
in various ways. Leahy himself said that he was the Presi-
dent's Chief of Staff and viewed his most important function
as maintaining continuing liaison between the President and
37
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He formed the link between the
White House and the Pentagon, keeping the JCS apprised of
the President's thinking and informing the President of the
views of the JC^, In this way, he performed a function later
g5 Ibid., p. 413.
36Hammond, Organizing; For ;Defense_, ?• 186,




to be handled by the Chairman of the JCS and, still later,
by the secretary of Defense.
Admiral Leahy's duties were somewhat broader than
liaison, however. He attended conferences with the President
and sat in on political sessions as well as military ones.
He says, "My presence was required at all of the purely
military meetings of these war councils. In addition,
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman both asked me to attend many
of the political sessions where only Stalin, Churchill, and
Roosevelt (Truman at Potsdam) and a fev; of their top advisers
sat around the conference table. The conferences Admiral
Leahy attended and the primary participants of each were:
Trident, Kay 12-24, 1943, Washington, D.C.
Koosevelt, Churchill, Soong.
Quadrant, August 14-24, 1943, Quebec. Roosevelt,
Church! 11, Soong.
Sextant, November 23-26, December 2-6, 1943,
Cairo. Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang.
Eureka, November 28-Docernber 1, 1943, Teheran.
Koosevelt, Churchill, Stalin.
Octagon, September 11-16, 1944, Quebec. Roose-
velt, Churchill.
Argonaut, February 2-11, 1945, Yalta. Roosevelt,




Terminal, July 16 -August 1, 1945, Potsdam. Tru-
39
man, Churchill, Atlee, Stalin.
In view of his participation in decision making at tho
highest level, Admiral Leahy's views on military participa-
tion in policy formulation are both interesting and perti-
nent :
Army and Navy "brass" frequently are accused, par-
ticularly in time of war, of seeking to override the
civilian restraints imposed by our laws and by our Con-
stitution. As this is written, I have been a part of
that brass for many years and have found by experience
that at times this accusation is justified. In most
cases the stepping out of bounds arises from a seal to
prosecute a war in such a manner that our enemies may be
vanquished in the shortest possible tirne.^0
VII. PLANNING FOR POST-WAR YEARS
As the outcome of the war became more certainly pre-
dictable and the victory of the Allies became surer, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff joined 7/ith other segments of the
government in considering the role to be played by the mili-
tary in the post-war period. A great deal of their thoughts
were directed toward the organizational structure in which
the military should be placed. Unification of the armed
forces was a subject of long and sometimes bitter debate by
national leaders. The JOS discussed this subject in closed
39 Ibid., p. 489-495. 4Q Ibid . , p. 368.
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session on May 15, 1944. General Marshall favored a statu-
tory JCS with a single cabinet-level officer in charge of
all elements of national defense. The Navy's position as
stated by Admiral King opposed a single defense organiza-
tion. Admiral Leahy said that the ad hoc. system developed
during the war seemed to be working well and suggested that
the problem be further studied. Interestingly, all parties
to this discussion believed that the JCS should be rcspon-
41
sible only to the President.
The civilian leaders of the military departments were
also concerned with the actions needed to improve the peace-
time policy-making apparatus of the national government. A
foremost architect of the post-war organization was to be the
first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. In April, 1945,
while Secretary of the Navy, he believed that the Army and
Navy should not be the makers of policy but should define the
military necessities of the na.tion to the policy makers,
a?
both for defense and for maintaining world peace," He fur-
ther foresaw, in June, 1945, the need for a post-war organi-
zation to enable the military services and other government
departments and agencies to provide for and protect national
41 Ibid. t p. 239.
42Walter Millis (ed. ), The Forrestal. Diaries (New
York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 63.

security. *&
These debates, discussions, and disagreements were to
be reflected in the post-war problems attendant to establish,
ing a revised policy-making machinery.
VIII. SUMMARY
In this period the Navy's role in policy making was
changing dramatically in two respects. In its infa.ncy, the
Navy had contributed to foreign policy formulation primarily
through the action of individuals and most often at great
distances from the national capital. The passa.ge of time
had seen the Navy's contributions come more freeuently
through an organizational structure and at the seat of the
government, This trend continued in the post-war period;
as will be evident in the following chapter.
There is little question that the Navy h^s con-
tributed to the formulation of foreign policy from the
nineteenth century to the present. This examination has
revealed a change in the methods by which the Navy's con-
tributions were made rather than an assessment of the




POST-WAR ORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The present role of the Navy in formulating foreign
policy is determined to a great extent by the organizational
framework within which the Navy's policy-makers operate. It
should be instructive, therefore, to examine the Department
of Defense, its evolution, and the place of the Navy therein.
I. THE FIRST MOVES TOWARD REORGANIZATION
During World War II, the heads cf the military ser-
vices functioned as a. corporate body entitled the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. As was pointed out in the predecing chapter,
the legislative base for this body was non-existent, but it
wielded considerable influence over the making of policy in
the war years.
When the war was over, the nerd for formalizing the
ad hoc. arrangements of the war years arose. The problem was
to alter the prevailing arrangement rather than to return to
the status quo ante, bellnrn because the events of the war had
proven that a return to pre-World War II relationships was
not desirable. A ne*,v place in the international community
for the United States and new requirements for national
security had been outgrowths of the war. A new organization
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for national security was needed to meet the new situation.
The necessity for a greater degree of inter-service
co-operation than previously practiced was recognized by
both civilian end military leaders. The advent of atomic
weapons presaged a revolution in military thought, as the
disciples of Mitchell and Douhet, who had been unable to
prove their doctrines in World War II, saw in the new weapons
another chance to prevail in war with air power alone. Since
these changes had taken place, a return to the independent
departments of earlier days was considered unsatisfactory by
a majority of leaders in government.
Alteration was desirable, but the nub of the question
was the direction and extent of alteration. Congress feared
a single military czar, commander of all the armed forces of
the nation. As Huntington notes, such an organization would
have strengthened the voice of the military in government
since it v/ouid have spoken with one voice rather than two or
1
three. At the same time "both the President and the Con-
gress wanted to be able to deal with the military establish-
ment as a whole (while, to be sure, preserving the option
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and. The State
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University




to deal with its parts as well.)"
Nonetheless, the President and most Army officers
desired the creation of a single military chief of staff.
The Navy opposed such a plan. The Army Air Corps continued
its battle for autonomy. Suggestions had been advanced for
formation of a high level body to determine national policy.
All of these issues were debated against a background of
demobilization, diminishing interest in military affairs,
fatigue with war, and lack of a widespread awareness of the
threat posed the United States by the Soviet Union and inter-
national communism.
It has been said that the early consideration cf
legislation on military unification fell into two major
stages: (1) 1944 to early 1946, when the primary concern
was with the general structural questions, and (2) 1946 to
July, 1947, when the concern was centered on the forces,
gfunctions, and status of the Navy. Throughout both periods
the Navy sought an organizational structure emphasizing
voluntary co-ordination, basically horizontal in nature.
The Army preferred a more nearly vertical structure ?/ith
2
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greater authority vested in a military chief of staff and a
single civilian secretary. In broad terms the Congress was
more favorable to the Navy's position, the President to the
Army's, although by 1946 the Congress had already merged the
Military and Naval Affairs Committees and the Army and Navy
Appropriations subcommittees."
The Congress received the administration's first pro-
posed plan for post-war organization in December, 1945.
This plan, which proposed a single department of the armed
forces and a single military chief of staff, was not well
received by the Congress and was rejected. Congress also
rejected the second proposal, which would hsve created a
single executive department containing all three services.
This proposal had carried the endorsement of the Secretaries
of War and the Navy, Luring the fall and winter of 1946-47,
a third compromise pla.n was developed to which both services
a.greed. The following summer the Congress enacted this plan
5into law as the National Security Act of 1947.
^Huntington, o_d< cijt_.
, p. 422,
National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat . 495, Public
Law 253, 80th Congress, July 27, 1947,
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II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
It is not an exaggeration to describe the National
Security Act of 1947 as the most important and far-reaching
piece of peacetime military legislation in the nation's his-
tory. This act created the National Military Establishment
headed by a civilian secretary, the Secretary of Defense.
Within the National Military Establishment existed the three
service departments, each of which enjoyed the status of an
executive department. The Army Air Corps was divorced from
the Army and became the United States Air Force, forming a
part of the newly created Department of the Air Force. The
national intelligence effort v/as concentrated in a newly
created agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, in which
one of the two top officials could be a military officer on
active duty.
At the apex of the organization created by the Act of
1947 was a new policy organ, the National Security Council.
Among the functions of the Council described by the Act was
thst of advising the "President with respect to the integra-
tion of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to
the national security so as to enable the military services
and the other departments and agencies of the Government to
co -operate more effectively in matters involving the national
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security," Members of the National Security Council were
the President, the vice President, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Mutual Security,
the Chairman of the national Resources Board (which was also
created by the Act), and the Service Secretaries. Provision
was also made for the necessary staff support for the Coun«
cil.
Within the National Military Establishment the exist-
ence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was given statutory author-
ization by the Act of 1947. To provide staff for the Chiefs,
a Joint Staff was created with membership limited to one hun-
dred officers. From the relatively small size of this staff,
it is apparent that most of the staff support for the ser-
vice chiefs would continue to come from their own service
staffs. Nevertheless, for the first time, the United States
had a joint military staff that was based on statutory author-
ity. The role and importance of this staff was to increase
in the coming years.
To provide a body for co-ordinating the broad policy
of the National Military Establishment, the Act of 1947
created the Armed Forces Policy Council. This body consisted
of the Secretary of Defense (and, later, his Deputy), the




service secretaries, and the service chiefs. Even so, the
service secretaries and chiefs retained the right of direct
access to the President. This right is generally considered
an important indication of an official's stature and influence
in official Washington.
The act did not provide the Secretary of Defense with
either the staff support or the authority to rival the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or the service departments in making and
7
administering policy. His role was to provide a link
J>between the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs o
o
Staff, and the services. The rather limited scope of the
Secretary's power is evident from Forrestal's conception of
his role as involving predominantly the negotiation of con-
sensus with the military establishment." Furthermore, during
his tenure in office, Secretary Forrestal was made aware that
the major decisions on national security would be made in the
White House and that he would execute them to the best of his
ability. As first created, the office of the Secretary of
Defense, while an important one, did not carry an extra-
ordinary amount of power within the Government. It provided
an opportunity for the Secretary to make his views known,




9 Ibid., p. 232. lOlbid., p. 234.
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would support the same positions.
Secretary Forrestal, who had led the Navy's fight
against excessive unification while Secretary of the Navy,
discovered that the Secretary of Defense required additional
authority if his job was to be done effectively. Con-
sequently, in his first report, he recommended, inter alia
:
(1) a clarification of the authority of the Secretary of
Defense (implicit in such clarification would be an increase),
(2) the provision of an Under Secretary of Defense, (2) the
provision of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (4)
the removal of the service secretaries from the National
11
Security Council.
Implementation of these recommendations would obvi-
ously increase the power of the Secretary of Defense and
result in greater centralization of authority in the national
Military Establishment. Within two years of the Secretary's
report, all of the recommended changes above had been both
accepted and implemented. This action had considerable
impact on the manner in which military positions regarding
foreign policy problems were put forward. The services no
longer had representation on the national Security Council
and were renuired to act through proxies— the Secretary of







Another move toward unifying the strategic direction
of the nation's military effort took place with the Key West
Agreement in 1948, Although this agreement dealt primarily
with determining the functions of the several services, it
also emphasized the duty of the Joint Chiefs to provide
integrated or unified military staff plans rather than com-
pilations of service oriented plans for use as guide lines
in the development of the various programs of the National
12
Military Establishment.
III. THE 1949 AMENDMENTS
In 1949 the Ebersta.dt task force of the Hoover Com-
mission completed its investigation of the organisation of
the national military effort. It concluded that a single
chief of staff was not needed since the President and the
Secretary of Defense (underlining supplied) filled this role.
The task force believed that a single chief of staff would
result in too much power being placed in military hands with
"consequent dangers to our democratic institutions," The
12 I bid., p. 237.
lsPhillip Barry Brannen, nA Single Service: Peren-
nial Issue in National Defense," United States Naval Insti -
tute Proceedings . 83:1283-1284, December, 1957.
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task force further feared that a single chief of staff system
would suppress differences of opinion and "when military
14differences disappear, military progress will cease."
In view of the conclusions of the Hoover Commission
end the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, the
first amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 were
enacted by Congress in August, 1949. These amendments were
of sufficient significance to affect materially the entire
national defense organization. In addition, they indicated
clearly a. move toward greater unification and centraliza-
tion.
Several weaknesses a.nd limitations in the authority
of the Secretary of Defense were eliminated by the 1949
amendments, via : (1) the status of the military services
were degraded from that of executive departments to that of
military departments within the Department of Defense (pre-
viously the National Military Establishment), (2) the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense
was no longer limited by the word "general," (3) the Secre-
tary of Defense was designated the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of
Defense, (4) direct access to the President by the service
l^Howard E. Orem, "Shall We Junk The JOS?", United
States Naval Institute Proceedings . 84:59, February, 1958.
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chiefs and secretaries was eliminated although these offi-
cials could go to the Congress, (o) the "States Kights"
clause, which reserved to the services all authority not
specifically granted to the Secretary of Defr.nse, v/as
revoked, (6) the service secretaries lost their seats on the
National Security Council, (7) three Assistant Secretaries
were author! zee the Secretary of Defense (an Under Secretary
had been provided earlier in the year by separate legislation
with the title changed to Deputy Secretary by these a.mend-
ments), and (8) the position of Chairman of the Joint
1 ft
Chiefs of Staff v/as created.
It is obvious that these changes placed considerably
greater authority in the hands of the Secretary of Defense.
Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to be
a military officer, the creation of this position was
intended to a.ssist the Joint Chiefs in rising a.bove service
17
interests and acting for the overall good.
Another endorsement of greater centralization is indi-
cated by the -Congressional approval of an increase in the
size of the Joint Staff of the JCS from one hundred to two
^Timothy SIT. Stanley, American Defense and National




l ?Kuntington, 0£. pit. , p. 4?6.
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hundred and ten members. The creation of the office of the
Chairman and the increase in the size of the Joint Staff
caused a great deal of soul searching in the Congress where
the specter of the man on horseback still concerned many.
The office of the Chairman was surrounded by strict safe-
18
guards, a.nd its powers were narrowly defined.
IV. THE KOREAN WAR PERIOD
The Korean Wax provided a test of the nation's new
military organization under stress conditions. All in all,
the organization performed well although not always in the
manner in which its designers had anticipated it would.
Prior to the outbreak of the war, President Truman had made
it a point net to sit regularly with the National Security
Council since he feared that his presence would imply a
delegation of authority to that body that he did not intend
19
to make. A great deal of the planning at this time took
place in informal discussions between the working staffs of
the State and Defense Departments. There was a weekly
meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of
the State Department, usually the Deputy Secretary, the
Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Assistant Secre-
18 Ibid.
, p. 442. 19Ha.miF.ond, op_. cit ., p. 832.
20IMd .. p. 248.

48
tary for Far ^astern Affairs. Representation from the
civilian elements in the Defense Department did not begin
21
until the summer of 1951. Secretary Marshall did, how-
22
ever, occasionally meet with the Chiefs.
This period marked the emergence of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs as a
major molder of policy. This official handled numerous
important matters without reference to the Secretary .for
25decision. The strong link between this office and the
State Department was beginning to form.
The major change made in the structure of the Depart-
ment during this period was effected by the Congress with
the passage of the Marine Corps Act in 1952. This legisla-
tion provided that on issues that the Commandant of the
Marine Corps considered as directly affecting the Marine
Corps he would serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff with a voice and vote equal to that ox the other ser-
24
vice chiefs. This act is also the only legislation which
establishes minimum unit strength for one of the armed ser-
25
vices. v It should be noted that after this time, despite
21IM£« 22 lbid., p. 249. 2SIbid, » P« 253.
24Nathan F. Twining, "The JCS, " Ordnance, 42:898,
Hay -June, 1959.
25
oamuel P. Huntington, The Coir^on. p_ofe;;;»o (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1951), p, 140.
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bitter budget battles and shifting strategies, the orga.niza-
tional existence of no service was seriously threatened by
another. °
V. THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1953
The desire still persisted to increase the authority
of the Secretary of Defense, nonetheless; the urge to merge
had abated, but the craving for greater centralization con-
tinued. Upon his retirement in 1952, Secretary of Defense
Lovett proposed that the Secretory of Defense be designated
27
unambiguously as the Deputy Commander in Chief. The pro-
posal that Congress had rejected six years before was again
in circulation, and based on the experiences of the Ivorean
War, Congress and the Administration took another searching
look at the Defense Department. The Reorganization Act of
1953 resulted.
It is instructive to compare the changes ma.de to the
national military organization by the Amendments of 1949 and
the Reorganization Act of 1952. The former was based on two
years of operation in a perilous but peaceful period. The
1953 reorganization could consider the experiences of four
more years of operation, which included the Korean V.ar.
Because of this, one would imagine that the 1953 changes
2 6 Ibid ., p. 375, 27Hammond, on., cit ., p. 229.

50
would be more far-reaching and of greater consequence. On
the contrary, however, when compared to the sweeping amend-
ments of 1949, the changes of 1953 appear to be a tidying-up
operation. Certainly, significant alterations to defense
machinery were made in 1953, but the basic structure was
left unchanged.
Just as World War II had v/itnessed a divorce between
the military and civilian components of the service depart-
ments, so the Korean War saw the Joint Chiefs of Staff again
taking the major role. State Department influence was much
greater than in the Second .Vorld War, but again the civilian
elements of the military departments did not participate to
the fullest extent. The primary purpose of the changes in
1955, then, was to improve the relationship of the Joint
28
Chiefs of Staff with the rest of the Defense Department,
One avenue of approach was an increase in the staff
support provided the Secretary of Defense—six more assist-
ant secretaries and a genera.I counsel were authorized.
Another tactic was to reduce the tendency of the Joint
Chiefs to operate forces and to emphasize their responsi-
bility as strategic planners. This was done by making the
military departments rather than members of the Joint Chiefs
the executive agents for the unified commands. The service
28Ibii..
» P. S24 «
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secretary could delegate this responsibility to the chief of
the service; thus, in actual practice, the same officer
could be functioning as the executive agent under both the
old and new systems. In the new system, however, the chain
of command was through the service secretary to the Secre-
tary of defense rather than through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
The most debated changes in 1953 related to the
authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, It
will be recalled that Congress had approached the establish-
ment of this office with considerable reluctance in 1949,
Proposals in 196b to increase the authority of the Chairman
met with great Congressional resistance. The House Committee
on Government Operations disapproved the proposed increase
in the Chairman's authority. The proposal was, however,
passed in the House itself by a vote of 234 to 108, 29 The
size and fervor of the dissenting bloc indicated that the
Congress had gone as far as it would in strengthening the
Chairman's office at that time.
The proposals appear innocuous now, in light of
events since 1955, out at the time Congressmen read sinister
threats into them. These particular proposals arose mainly
from President Eisenhower's desire that the Joint Staff
29Huntington, The Soldier and_ The State , p. 422.
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possess more of the characteristics of a unified staff and
that the business of the Joint Chiefs be handled more
30
smoothly. v In sum, the changes gave the Chairman manage-
ment responsibility and authority over the Joint Staff and
authority to s.pprove or reject nominees for the Joint Staff
31
from the services. Opposing Congressmen had feared that
this arrangement might lead to the development of a Joint
Staff that would in reality reflect the Chairman's views and
32
thus be a personal general staff.
71. THE CHAIRMAN AND THE CHIEFS
The role of the Chairman did not develop in the
fashion that the architects of the Defense Department organi-
zation had envisioned in 1949. Although the office had been
designed to assist the Chiefs in rising above service loyal-
ties, actually its main impact had been in civil -military
r el at ions „ The Chairman had emerged as the military spokes-
man for the Defense Department and was serving as a link
33
between the Department and the .Vhite House. General Omar
Bradley, Chairman for four years, made two hundred seventy-
two visits to the White House and attended sixty-eight meet-
30Ha.mmond, on., oit .. p. 321. glIbid », p. 288.
32 Stanley, p_p_. eit . . p. 106,
33Huntington, The Soldier and. The State , p. 436.
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ings of the National Security Council. President Kisenhower
received a weekly briefing from the Chairman on the military
34
situation.
This arrangement had the effect of making the Chair-
man not only spokesman for the military but also spokesman
for the President to the military. If the Secretary of
Defense showed any reluctance to initiate policy, an aggres-
sive Chairman v/cs admirably situated to exert predominant
influence in the development of military policy,
Despite protestations to the contrary, the Reorgani-
zation Act of 1955 continued the reduction of the power of
the military departments. This had also been a major result
of the Amendments of 1949, By this time, the ability of the
Comptroller to affect strategic plans by his handling of the
budget was beginning to be felt increasingly. As Huntington
states, "A reduction, of five percent in military estimates
might be the result of acute fiscal management; a reduction
of twenty-two percent necessarily implied basic decisions of
strategy. . ", , So long as the Secretary of Defense was
unable to arrive at an independent balancing of military and
fiscal demands, the basic decisions on military policy were
inevitably the result of the political battles of the Comp-
35
troller vs. the Chiefs." Paul Y, Hammond says, "In place
34tv«j ^o tIbid. ^Ibid,, p, 440.
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of unifying by strategy, the Defense Department achieved its
consolidated programs with the blue pencil of the Deputy




Thus, pressure was on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Their plans and strategic concepts depended upon their bud-
gets, which were receiving a striking amount of attention
from the Comptroller. Because the executive agents for the
unified commands v/ere now the military departments, the Joint
Chiefs had marginal authority in that area at best. As a
matter of fact, in referring to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
1957, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the Chief of Naval Oper tions,
37
said, "They do not command anything."
The Joint Chiefs v/ere alleged by their detractors to
be unable to rise above the interests of their services.
This situation was believed to result in their deliberations
a.nd pronouncements as a. corporate body being in the nature
of bargains a.nd compromises, rather than n decisions based on
38judgment which transcended service interests."*
Criticism was also leveled at the Joint Chiefs because
^Hammond, o_p_. cit.
, p. 252.
S7Arieigh A. Burke, "The JCS In Operation," United
States I'iaval Institute Proceedings , 83:557, March, 1957.
38Hammond, op_. cit .. p„ 327-528.
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of their inability to agree on all issues with the result
that "split" pa.pers were sent to the Secretary of Defense
for decision. Gene M, Lyons made the point that "the great-
est part of the increase of authority gained by the civilian
leadership in the Department of Defense has accrued because
of the inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come to




On the other hand, Admiral Eurke declares that splits
££~L §6 are no ^ a ba^ thing; they permit the civilians head-
ing the department to know what is going on and thereby
insure effective civilian control. "If knowledge of the
alternatives, as well as the main issues, is not regularly
available to them (civilian officials), you do not have
40
effective civilian control."
Undoubtedly there were sharp differences of opinion
and different strategic concepts favored by the Joint Chiefs
as individuals, but the theme of disagreement can easily be
exa.ggera.ted. Vice Admiral Howard Orem states thet the Joint
Chiefs of Staff mads over t?/0 thousand decisions from 195o to
1S55 and that less than two percent of these JCS decisions
59 Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil -Military delations,"
.American Political Science Heview, 50:55, March, 1961.




were split. General Nathan Twining, former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Chief of Jtaff of the Air
Force, also declares that the Joint Chiefs disagreed less
42
than two percent of the time.
In line with these observations, James Forrestal made
a statement that remains as pertinent now as when it was
made in 1945:
The JCo, while it was accused of being a debating
society, for that very reason probably was the most prac-
tical and -useful device that could have been conceived
for the conduct of the war,
. , . It is a pretty good
thing for anyone charged with the responsibility of great
decisions to have to maintain his point of view before an
earnest and intelligent opposition. 43
The Joint Chiefs of Staff system was not faultless in
the 1950s but neither did the system contain major structural
defects.
VII. THE 1958 REORGANIZATION
It is understandable that the changes proposed in the
reorganization of 1958 did not attempt to make basic changes
in the existing structure. In sending the administration's
proposal to Congress in April, 1958, President Eisenhower
said, "Clearly we should preserve the traditional form and
pattern of the services but should regroup and redefine cer-
41 4.P
Orem, loc . cit. Twining, op_. pit . , p. 900.




Perhaps the most significant action of the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1958 was the abolition of the system of executive
45
agents for unified commands. " The unified commanders would
now report to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Depending upon one's interpretation, this
may or may not be considered as putting the Joint Chiefs into
the business of controlling operations, but they were surely
46
much more involved in operations than before this change.
Other provisions in the 1958 reorganization included
another increase in the size of the Joint Staff. The new
personnel ceiling was established as four hundred, exactly
47four times the number authorized eleven years before. The
increasing importance of the Joint Staff is obvious, With
the increase in personnel, the Joint Staff changed its struc-
ture from a committee-oriented arrangement to a staff organi-
44Ace I.. Waters, Jr. and Jack 1. Rogers, "The.
fteorgenizg.tion of the Department of Defense, " Armor, 68:18,
January-February, 1959*
45Twining, pjp_, pit, p. 898,
^°ln Organizing For Defense, p. 376, Hammond seems to
misjudge this arrangement by stating that the 3Gz "ha.s crossed
the dividing line from planning to operations." He dismisses
rather lightly the fact that command is vested in the Secre-
tary of Defense. The real increase in authority here accrues
to the unified commanders rattier than to the JCS.
47Twining, loc , cit .
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zation. Recalling the distinction in World .Var II between
joint staff planning and joint committee work (page 31,
supra) makes apparent the significance of this organization
of the Joint Staff.
A step richer in symbolic value than practical appli-
cability was the provision that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff could vote in that body. Since matters are
not decided by a show of hands in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
meetings, this provision did not have much direct practical
effect. It did, however, indicate a willingness on the part
of the Congress as well as the administration for the Chair-
man's position to acquire more prestige.
An eminently practical step was taken when the vice
chiefs of staff were authorised to perform some duties pre-
viously reserved exclusively to the chief of the service.
This authorization was made contingent on the delegation of
authority by the chief of service--however, before this the
duties could not be delegated regardless of the desires of
the chief of service. The rationale behind this change was
to lessen the service workload on the chief of the service
so that he could devote more of his effort to his duties as
a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Under the Reorganization Act of 1958, the Secretary
of Defense gained increased power to transfer, abolish,
reassign, or consolidate non-combatant functions within the
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Department* This authority has been used more by Secretary
McNamara than by his predecessors.
The final provision of the 1958 act to be discussed
was the establishment of the position and organization of
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. This
official, more than any other, determines the nature of
48
future weapon systems. This power arises from his duties,
which include: (1) acting as principal adviser to the Sec-
retary on scientific and technical matters, (2) supervising-
all research and engineering activities in the Department of
Defense, and (3) directing and controlling the research and
engineering activities in the Department that the Secretary
49
determines to require centralized management.
In short, as Hammond says, "The 1958 reorganization
was a decision all the more in favor of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as the source of policy leadership for the military
50
establishment. n He believes that the only impediment to a
great gain in pov/er by the Joint Chiefs lies in their
51
possessing divided loyalties. This view cannot be entirely
accepted. The size, scope, and authority of the various seg-
^-8
tfilliam H. Xintner, "Progress in Defense Organiza-




, p. 329. Sl lbid .
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me.nts of the staff in the Office of the secretary cf Defense
make it unlikely that the Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff could gain
very much more power even if the situation is considered in
the light of structural organization alone. Another argument
against Mr, Hammond's view, and it seems a conclusive one, is
the manner in which Secretary McNaraara has taken charge of
the Department and has conducted its affairs.
VIII. THE CURRENT STATUS
In conjunction with the statement above, it may be
well to examine the Defense Department under Mr. McNamara's
leadership. Although there have been no further legislative
reorganizations of the Defense Department since the Act of
1958, extremely significant changes have been made under the
authority granted the Secretary in the 1958 Act, In October,
1961, U._S._ News and »Yorld Report stated that Secretary Mc-
Kamara sought not a single service but a centralized Defense
set-up. His methods of achieving the desired degree of
centralization have been interesting and instructive to
observe and generally successful in attaining their aims.
Among the most important organizational actions taken
by Mr. McNamara have been the increases in the number of
v2nMcNams,ra in Control: A Firm Ha.nd At Pentagon,"
U.S. News and florid Report, 51:65-57, October 2, 1961,
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centralized joint agencies. Specific reference is made here
to the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the Defense Supply Agency, and the Defense
Atomic Support Agency. 'To be accurate, it must be noted that
not all of these agencies were created during Secretary Mc—
Mamara's term of office. It has been during that time, how-
ever, that they have achieved impressive proportions. The
purpose of each of these agencies, generally, is to eliminate
duplication in the work of the services and the department's
other agencies and elements. Considerable success is claimed
for them by their proponents.
At present the position of the Secretary of Defense
still falls short of the one-man rule so feared by the Con-
gresses of the immediate post-war period. The official in
this cabinet post does, however, have powers far exceeding
those first granted in 1947. Paul Y, Hammond has posed the
question of the role of the Secretary of Defense since the
objectives of defense policy are established by the State
Department, the requirements to achieve the objectives are
determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the funds to
provide the requirements are administered by the Bureau of
the Budget. The answer to this question is that while the
*^Paul Y. Hammond, ,: Decisionmaking in Defense: The
Kole of Organization, Effects of Structure on Policy, " Pub-
lic Administration -Review , 18:176, Summer , 1958,
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Secretary of Defense does not have exclusive responsibility
in any of these areas, he has major responsibilities in each
of them. It is he who must insure that the various elements
are brought together in a viable defense policy.
In practice the Secretaries of Defense have functioned
more as a delegate of the -American people to the military
54
than as a delegate of the military to the American people.
This has prevented the development of military positions that
failed to take due account of the overall national and inter-
national situation. The military elements in the Defense
Department have not been permitted to proceed in their plan-
ning with blinders on. It is, of course, entirely possible
that military planning could have been accomplished with
equal realism and success without this kind of control.
The distinction between the present system and its
predecessors is highlighted by the existence of the Rational
Security Council with its great potential for handling and
even preventing crisis situations. The preparations for the
Secretary of Defense's participation in deliberations of the
Council demonstrate the depth a.s well as the scope of the
development of the Defense Department. Staff support for
the Secretary's participation in Council matters comes not
only from the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also and perhaps
S^K-untington, The Soldier and The State, p. 441.
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even more from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
55
national Security Affairs.
As this indicates, the responsibilities and influence
of the assistant secretaries of defense have been steadily
growing. One of the most influential of these officials is
the aforementioned Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs. This official is responsible for estab-
lishing the Department's positions and plans relating to such
subjects as foreign military affairs, military assistance
plans and programs, the regional security organizations, the
56
United Nations, and overseas base rights.
Other assistant secretaries have similar responsi-
bilities in their ov/n areas of activity and authority.
Limitations do exist in the authority of the assistant secre-
taries in relations With the military departments, An assis-
tant secretary can issue orders to a military department only
if he receives written authority from the Secretary of
Defense with respect to a specific subject area, and the
orders are issued through the service secretaries or their
57designated representatives.
The latter stipulation, above, raises the question of
0oKintner, on., cit . . p. 82,
^Hammond, Organizing For Def ense , p. 50 7-308.
&7Ibid .. p. 81.
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the present position of the service secretaries in the
national policy machinery. Theoretically, the service secre-
taries should function an. lower level policy strategists in
support of the Secretary of Defense. In practice, however,
this has not proven a realistic role for the..e officials.
They do not hold positions on the primary policy ma.king
bodies and efforts to provide them with a vehicle for such
58
work have not been fruitful. Huntington considers that the
"most sa.tisfactory role for the service secretaries is prob-
ably to represent the principle of decentralization by serv-
ing as spokesmen for the military and civilian needs of their
59
services." Lyons believes that this is in fact the present
practice, "A service secretary is more and more a spokesman
for the service; less and less a policy making instrument
for the .Secretary of Defense."
Nevertheless, the impression persists that the Joint
Chiefs cf Staff are the central military spokesmen—with the
61
exception of the .Secretary of Defense, himself. The rapid
turnover of top civilian officials has no doubt contributed
to this situation. Colonel Kintner has noted that a year is
required for an official to master the duties of his office,
and Kintner then observes that the average term for top
58Huntington, The_ Soldier and The State
, p. 431.







civilian officials in the Defense Department is eighteen
CO
months. For example, the first secretaries of both the
Army and the Navy in the Kennedy administration had been
replaced before the administration was seventeen months old,
David Lawrence believes that the Secretary of Defense
should "make better vise of the military minds so that civil-
63ian authority will have the best available advice." He
does not suggest organizational changes to effect this and
apparently has in mind a greater reliance by the Secretary
on the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Lawrence states that in practice
64
the Secretary of Defense is the Deput;^ Commander in Chief.
Such a situation insures civilian control of the mili-
tary at the department level. As a matter of fact, the Chief
of Staff of the Army alleged in 1953 that there were nineteen
civilians in the chain of command between him and the Presi-
dent.
The services have exerted more effort in the past few
years than ever before to maintain a cordial working relation-
62William R. Kintner, Forging A New Sword (New York:
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p, 71; also "Progress
in Defense Organization," p. 92,
David Lawrence, "An Impossible Job," U,S, News and
forld Report , 47:120, December 14, 1961.
64Ibid.
^Laurence I. Hadway, "Decision-Making in Defense:
The xtole of Organization. Uniforms and Mufti: tfhat Place in
Policy ?
,





ship with Congress. Expenditures by the military for legis-
66
lative liaison doubled from 1953 to 1958; for although
Congress has chosen to exercise but little control over any
strategic decisions, it still holds the purse strings for
the defense budget. it is interesting to note, however,
that except when confronted v/ith similar competing programs,
since .Vorld ffar II Congress has not vetoed directly "a major
strategic program, a force level recommendation, or a major
6 V
weapons system proposed by the administration in power."
Congressional willingness to have the executive agencies
make these determinations was perhaps most succinctly
expressed by Senator Kussell of Georgia, "If Congress
starts legislating military strategy, Cod help the American
people." 58
IX. SUMMARY
In summary, the years since the end of V/crld ;/ar II
have witnessed a remarkable change in the place of the armed
forces in the governmental structure. In the pre-war years,
the military spoke through two Cabinet level officials who
^Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and
the Political Roles of the Armed Services, " American Politi -
cal Science ffeview , 50:41, March, 1961,
6 7Kuntington, The, Common Defense , p. 153.
68flew York Times, March 15, 1959, p. 17.
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were not often competing for funds or projects since their
budgets and organizations were entirely separate* During the
war the uniformed voice of the military services gained cen-
ter stage and exerted considerable influence on the nation's
policies, Since the war, however, the uniformed segment of
the services has moved into the background. The major voice
of the military is now the Secretary of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense gets his staff support from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the Joint
Chiefs of staff and the individual services. Therefore, the
input to policy by the services is through a proxy and is
often channeled to this proxy (the secretary) through the
organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this sense
the voice of the military in policy making has been muted.
Another aspect of the present situation provides a
contradictory conclusion. Because of the prevailing inter-
national situation, the newly accepted major position of the
United States in the world arena, and the changing nature of
the military • threat to the country, military aspects of
policy are much more important now than they were in earlier
years. Consequently, the need for military advice and. coun-
sel in the upper echelons of government is greater than it has
been in previous periods of peace. This has resulted in more
inputs to policy from the military.
It is difficult to determine which of these conditions
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has the greater effect. It is probable that an objective
analysis by historians of the future will determine that
despite the filter of departmental structure through which
it must passj military input to and influence on policy is
now greater than during any other period in which the nation
has been at peace.

CHAPTER IV
THE NAF/'S RECOGNITION OF ITS ROLE
Has the changing; role of the Navy in the formulation
of foreign policy stirred any interest in the officer corps
of the Navy? Is there evidence that naval officers have
become increasingly aware of the importance of this subject
to their service and to themselves? If so, what is being
done about it? This chapter will endeavor to answer the
first two of these questions; the next chapter will address
the last.
The Navy has always viewed itself as the nation's
first line of defense. Additionally, in years gone by, the
Navy's officers saw themselves as the instruments of the
nation for diplomatic actions in far away places. This con-
cept can be seen in John Paul Jones's famous letter to the
Marine Committee in September, 1775:
The naval officer should be familiar with the prin-
ciples of international lav;. ... He should also be
conversant with the usages of diplomacy and capable of
maintaining, if called upon, a dignified and judicious
diplomatic correspondence; because it often happens
that sudden emergencies in foreign waters make him the
diplomatic as well as military representative of his
country, and in such ca.ee s he may have to act without
opportunity of consulting civic or ministerial superiors
at home, an:i such action may easily involve the porten-
tous issue of peace or war between great powers. 1
^Letter from John Paul Jones to Marine Committee,
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With the introduction e.nd widespread use of long
range communications, the necessity for making foreign policy
on the spot declined. No longer did the senior American
official at the scene find himself confronted with a problem
for which he had no guidanco. Explicit and detailed guid-
ance could bo obtained in a timely fashion by radio. The
officers of the Navy found their involvement in policy making
of this kind greatly reduced.
As might be expected, the interests of the officer
corps turned to fields in which their active participation
was recuired. But, as the procedures for making policy
changed and as the Navy again had the opportunity to con-
tribute to policy making, there arose again the need for
naval officers to be knowledgeable in the fields of foreign
policy, international relations, and national security policy.
I. METHODOLOGY
The method used in this study to determine the degree
to which the officer corps of the Ilavy ha.s recognized this
need was an analysis of the material naval officers had been
reading and writing since the turn of the century. The
United States I* aval Institute Proceedings was chosen as the
September, 1775, in George K. Clark et, al_. , A Short History
of the United States Navy (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1939), p. 419.
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best index to the reading and writing habits of the officer
corps.
The United -States Naval Institute describes itself as
a. private, professional society for all who are interested in
naval and maritime affairs. A large number of naval officers
belong to the organization and receive its monthly publica-
tion, Proceedings. Further, it is a rare wardroom that does
not have the latest copy of the Proceedings available for its
membars. Topics of current interest to the officer corps are
addressed, analyzed, and debated in the pages of the Proceed-
ings . Because the Naval Institute is a self -supporting, non-
profit organization and is not a part of the Navy Department,
its contributors can address subjects and express views that
have not been officially accepted or promulgated. Thus, the
Proc eedings provides a forum for the expression of ideas that
are each author's own since articles published do not neces-
sarily reflect tha view of either the Navy Department or the
Naval Institute.
The Board of Control of the Naval Institute is com-
prised of elected members. Usually these men are senior
officers on active duty. With only one exception (1878-79),
the president of the Naval Institute has been an admiral.
Frequently, as is the case at present, the Chief of Naval
Operations serves as the President.
Because of its professional nature, its senior
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officer leadership, its widespread following in the officer
corps, and its prestige, the Proceeding? can be considered a.
valid index to the professional interests of the officer
corps.
To determine the degree of interest shown by naval
officers in foreign policy, an analysis was made of the con-
tent of various issues of the magazine since the turn of the
century. Individual issues covering twenty-one full years
v/ere considered. The years selected for analysis were those
marking the beginning of each decade and the years immedi-
ately preceding and following. Accordingly, all the issues
in each of the following years were used in the analysis:
1899-1901, 1909-1911, 1919-1921, 1929-1931, 1939-1941,
2
1949-1951, and 1959-1961. This selection should provide a
good cross section since it included both peacetime and war-
time as well as years just before and just after wars.
Three items were analyzed in each of the issues con-
sidered; viz.: (1) the subject matter of all the articles in
the issue, (2) the subject matter of the lead article in the
issue, and (3) the subject of the books reviewed in the
issue.
^United i?t p-te_s_ Naval Institute Pro ceed ings, Volumes
25, 26, 27, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 47, bb , 56, 57,~65, 66, 67,
7c, 76, 77, 85, 86, and 87. These volumes correspond to the
dates in the text. Every issue in each of the volumes was
included in the analysis.
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The reason for the first item is obvious--a. count of
articles by subject matter should provide a basis for mean-
ingful comparisons. The Proceedings usually places the most
significant article in the place of honor a.s lead article
for the issue. This is demonstrated by the position a.ccorded
prize essays in annual competitions. Therefore, a determina-
tion of which subject has been accorded this position should
provide an indication of the editor's evaluation of the
article's significance e Since the editor receives guidance
from senior officers on the Board of Control and since he is
aware of all the articles received (both published and
rejected), the lead article should reflect the thinking of a
large part of the officer corps as far as the article's
importance is concerned. For basically the same reasons,
the selection of books to be reviewed in the pages of the
Proceedings should reflect the interests of the officer
corps.
The articles and book reviews were classified by sub-
ject matter in this analysis. The classifications were not
identical for the two. In order to understand fully the
results of the analysis, a knowledge of the classifications
used is essential.
Articles were separated into nine classifications.
Often an article addressed subject matter in more than one
classification. In such cases the article was classified
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a.ccording to the major point being presented or pressed by
the author. The classifications vised in the analysis are
described in the following p-ragra.phs e
Foreign Eolicz* This classification included articles
on the nation's relations with other nations; on political/
economic philosophies, i .e. , fascism, socialism, communism;
and on international relations in general. It should be
noted that the distinction between this classification and
the one following was sometimes a fine one. The two classi-
fications were both of importance to this analysis.
Nat ional security policy . This classification
included articles on the organization of the United States
government and the national defense effort. The latter sub-
ject was expanded to include the size of the armed forces and
the employment of the various elements of national military
power. Hence, articles on the unification of the armed forces
fell into this classification as did those of earlier years
that stated the case for bx\ enlarged navy. Because this
classification and the preceding one were those that reflect
the interest of the officer corps in the Navy's role in the
development of foreign policy, they were the two of greatest
importance to this analysis. Hereinafter, they are referred
to as the primary classifications.
Administration and Personnel . This classification
and those that follow had only indirect bearing on the sub-
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ject at hand. They were defined for purposes of comparison
and as a matter of interest. The administration and person-
nel classification included articles on training, service
schools, and promotion as well as those specifically indi-
cated by the title,
Equipment and Te chnical Information. This classifi-
cation included articles dealing with materiel- and hardware.
The subject of articles ranged from the effect of dampness
on smokeless gun powder to the use of helium in deep sea
diving.
Operat ion s, This classification included articles on
fleet exercises and tactics, individual ship tactics, and
similar subjects. Any strategy discussed, in these articles
might be called battle area or combat strategy to distinguish
it from grand strategy, which was included in the national
security policy classification.
U«S« History. This classification included all the
articles on II. 3. history that were not properly placed within
another classification. The great majority of the articles
in this classification were concerned with the accomplish-
ments of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Mer-
chant Marine.
McjLern Foreign History. This classification is self-
explanatory except for the time frame included in "modern.
"
In this analysis this was defined to mean that the events
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addressed occurred within one hundred years of the date of
publication of the article.
No
n
-modern Foreign History. Articles in this classi-
fication addressed events that took pla.ce more than one hun-
dred years before the publication of the article. It could
be argued that this classification and the preceding one
reflect a degree of interest in foreign affairs and should
be made primary classifications. The articles themselves do
not fully support such an argument. Many of the articles in
these classifications were so restricted in their scope that
their importance was limited to describing a historical
application of military force.
?jQ£$l..gIL Navies—Appraisals. This classification
included articles that evaluated or described foreign navies
as they were at the time of the article. The classification
included articles on all navies whether allies, potential
allies, enemies, or potential enemies.
Leadership. This final classification included arti-
cles on all forms of leadership. Naturally, articles focused
on leadership in the Navy predominated,
The classifications used for book reviews were
slightly different from those used for articles. As before,
two of the classifications were entitled Foreign Policy and
National Security Policy. These classifications had the
same definitions as those used for articles. Books relating
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to history were divided, into classifications on the basis of
the type history presented and were classified as Military
History or Non-military History. A classification entitled
Peacetime Operations included books on explorations, research
and other peacetime activities of the armed services. The
final classification, Professional Information, included the
broadest scope of subject matter. This classification
included books ranging from advances in communications equip-
ment to the present composition of the Soviet Union's Havy,
from the status of research in underwater physiology to ord-
nance equipment and seamanship techniques.
During the period covered by this analysis, the Pro-
ceedin gs changed from a quarterly to a. monthly publication.
The change took place in two steps. The Proceedings changed
from a quarterly to a. bi-monthly in 1914 and from a bi-
monthly to a monthly publication in 1917. Because of this,
the first two periods considered in this analysis had only
four issues annually. Therefore, to permit more meaningful
comparisons, the results of the analysis include percentages
as well as a numerical count of articles and book reviews by
subject.
II. ANALYSIS
1899-1901 . The first three year period considered
contains the years immediately following the Spanish-American
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War, It might be expected that the interest of the officer-
corps in international affairs would have been very high dur-
ing this period. however, such an expectation is directly at
odds with the findings of this analysis. Very little atten-
tion was paid to the primary classifications in the pages of
the Procee dings published during this period. The twelve
issues of these three years presented seventy-six articles to
the readers. Only two of these articles could be classified
as directed toward National .Security Policy. Only one arti-
cle addressed Foreign Policy. Therefore, only 3,9>£ of the
articles published from 1899 to 1901 fell into the primary
classifications. During the same period, none of the nine
books reviewed addressed a primary classification. Books
reviewed were on subjects of Professional Information and
Military History. None of the lead articles addressed sub-
jects in the primary classifications. As might be expected,
fifty percent of the lead articles were on Operations.
Before the conclusion is reached that naval officers
of this period were totally unaware and uninterested in the
international situation, it must be noted that each issue of
the Proceedi ngs a.t the time included a section entitled
"Notes on International Affairs." This section was basically
a news service, providing information on current events.
Doubtless the section served a useful purpose in keeping
sea-going officers abreast of international news events, but
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the inclusion of this section did not reflect a high degree
of participating interest on the part of the officer corps.
The section did not include evaluation of the news nor did
it reflect contributions from the readers.
1909-1911. The second period analyzed showed very
little increase in the level cf interest shown by the offi-
cer corps in matters of foreign policy and national security
policy. Of the one hundred fifty-five articles published
during this period, eight (5.1/0 were in the two primary
classifications. This marked a slight increase over the
previous period,
Interestingly, however, two of the eight articles in
the primary classifications were lead articles. Thus, one
issue out of six had a lead article from the primary classi-
fications. This was a phenomenon that was evident in each
of the later periods analyzed. The percentage of lead arti-
cles devoted to the primary classifications was always higher
than the overall percentage of such articles. For example,
in this period only 5»1$ of the articles published were in
the two primary classifications, but 16.7/v of the lead arti-
cles were. This relationship, although not this exact ratio,
was apparent in every period analyzed. Several explanations
for this might be advanced. The most likely explanation is
that the editors recognised works on foreign policy and
national security policy as being of wider interest and of
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greater merit than more narrowly conceived articles. If this
explanation were accepted, it could be readily -understood why-
articles from the primary classifications appeared so' fre-
quently, as the lead articles.
None of the books reviewed in the 1909-1911 issues
?/ere in the primary classifications. Over ninety percent of
the twenty-four books reviewed dealt with either Military
History or Professional Information.
1919-1921. By the first year of the next period con-
sidered, the Proceedings was being issued on a monthly basis.
Accordingly, the period from 1919-1921 had more articles
published, two hundred sixty-four, than either of the two
earlier periods considered. Five of these articles addressed
Foreign Policy, and seventeen related to National Security
Policy. The total of these comprised 8.3$ of the articles
published. This was a relatively small percentage, but it
represented a continuation of the increase noted in the sec-
ond period.
Once again, one lead article in six came from the pri-
mary classifications. since the magazine was now a. monthly,
a total of six lead articles addressed the primary classifi-
cations. As it happened, all of these six articles were con-
cerned with na.tional security policy.
The issue of January, 1919, was the first considered
in which there was a review of a book addressing a primary

81
classification. During the three year period, one book on
National Security Policy and two books on Foreign Policy were
reviewed. These three books comprised 2.4;^ of the books
reviewed from 1919 to 1921.
Emphasis during the 1919-1921 period, as during the
previously considered periods, was on the practical, down-
to-earth facts that officers needed to know and understand
in order to operate their ships and shoot their guns. This
was reflected in the fact that sixty-five percent of the
bocks reviewed contained Professional Information. Another
twenty-eight percent were works on Military History.
1929-1951. In this period the percentage of articles
on National Security Policy and Foreign Policy again
increased. Three hundred eighty articles were presented in
the thirty-six issues published during this period. Forty-
five (11 ,9/S) of these were from the primary classifications.
Thus, for the fourth period analyzed, an increase in the
percentage of articles in the primary classifications was
noted.
Almost one issue in three featured a lead article
from the primary classifications. Eight artisles were on
National Security Policy; three articles were on Foreign
Policy. This was double the rate previously noted.
Attention to the primary classifications increased in
book reviews also. Thirteen of the books reviewed (10;*>)
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were devoted to National Security Policy and Foreign Policy.
19 59 -1941. The years immediately preceding the Second
World War saw a continuing growth in the interest shown by
naval officers in the primary classifications. The Proceed.-
ijngs, for 1959, 1940, and 1941 contained three hundred fifty
articles. Forty-four (12.6/a) of these had as their subject
either Foreign Policy (twenty-four articles) or National
Security Policy (twenty articles). Again, as in the years
before, a disproportionate number of articles from the pri-
mary classifications were featured as lead articles for the
magazine. Fifteen of the thirty-six issues (41 t 7fo) had lead
articles on National Security Policy (seven articles) or
Foreign Policy (eight articles).
Book reviews in the pre-World '.Yar II years also
reflected the growing interest of naval officers in these
areas. From 1939 to 1941, eighteen books (12,2$ of those
reviewed) dealt with Foreign Policy (eleven books) or
National Security Policy (seven books). The curve of inter-
est in each of the primary classifications was thus still
rising in each of the methods of measuring used. This indi-
cated a slowly but steadily increasing interest in the offi-
cer corps for the subjects of the primary classifications.
1949-1951
.
Predictably, the massive reorganizations
of the late 1940s were reflected in the articles appearing
in the Proceedings from 194.9 to 1951. Articles addressing
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Rational Security Policy accounted for s. full ten percent of
the number published. Another 7.7$ had to do with Foreign
Policy. All told, sixty-two of the three hundred fifty-one
articles presented during this three year period fell into
the two primary classifications.
The percentage of lead articles dealing with the pri-
mary classifications again increased. From 1949 to 1951
exactly one-half of the lead articles were on Foreign Policy
(seven articles) or National Security Policy (eleven arti-
cles)
.
Book reviews during this period were strongly oriented
toward the large number cf histories of World War II that
were then appearing; forty-four of the one hundred seventy-
seven books reviewed were directed toward V/orld War II, A
very small decrease in books addressing the two primary
classifications was noted for this period. Twenty-one books
(11, 9$) having to do with National Security Policy or Foreign
Policy were reviewed in the Proceedings in 1949, 1950, and
1951. During the 1939-1941 period, it will be recalled,
18. 2% of the books reviewed were concerned with the primary
classifications.
Up to this time, books on Professional Information
commanded a larger share of the reviewers 1 attention than
did those on any other subject. This applied to every period
considered. In the 1949-1951 period, sixty-one (£4.5$) of
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the books reviewed provided Professional Information.
1959-1961. By the end of 1S61 the Defense Department
had been tested in the Korean V/ar and ha.d been the subject
of two reorganization acts. A wartime five star general had
been succeeded as President of the United States by a wartime
Navy lieutenant. The methods of government, as well as the
style, had undergone numerous changes, ranging from minor
stylistic changes to fundamental re-alignment of governmental
machinery. The interest of naval officers in Foreign Policy
continued to grow in this environment.
More articles on Foreign Policy (fifty-three) appeared
in the Proceedings from 19o9 to 1961 than on any other sub-
ject. Not far behind was the number of articles dealing with
National Security Policy, forty-four. The combined total of
the two primary classifications accounted for 29.7$ of the
three hundred twenty-seven articles presented during this
three year period.
The trend toward a high percentage of lead articles
from the primary classifications continued. Twenty-six
articles, almost three-quarters of those presented, dealt
with Foreign Policy (nine) or National Security Policy
(seventeen )
.
Although books on Professional Information continued
to lead the list of book reviews (28.6$), books in the two
primary classifications were given more attention from 19o9
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to 1961 than in any other period considered* A total of
thirty books (15,5/0 dealing with the primary classifications
were reviewed during this period,
III. CONCLUSIONS
This analysis was drawn from two hundred four indi-
vidual issues of the Proceedings. A total of one thousand
nine hundred three articles and eight hundred five book
reviews were examined to develop the figures discussed above.
The appendix contains a graphic presentation of the figures
developed in this analysis.
From this analysis there appears to be firm evidence
to support the conclusion that the interest of naval offi-
cers in foreign and national security policy has been steadily
increasing since the turn of the century. The percentage of
articles dealing with the primary classifications increased
steadily and continuingly from less than four percent during
the 1899-1901 period to a level of almost thirty percent in
the 1959-1961 period. The size of this increase and the
steady growth that caused it indicate very strongly that the
officer corps has grown increasingly interested in national
security and foreign policy.
Additional weight is a.dded to the conclusion above by
the analysis of book reviews. During the first six years of
issues considered, not one book dealing with a primary
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classification was reviewed. However, by the 1959-1961 per-
iod, almost one book in six dealt with foreign or national
security policy, an average of nearly a book a month.
Recognition of the importance of the primary classifi-
cations was indicated in each of the periods studied by the
relatively high percentage of lead articles addressing the
primary subjects. This factor also showed a meaningful
increase, from seventeen percent in the 1909-1911 period to
seventy-two percent in the 1959-1961 period.
Analyzing each of the chosen indices illustrates a
growing interest on the part of the officer corps in foreign
policy and national security policy. Taken in combination,
these three factors demonstrate clearly that today's naval
officers have a greater degree of interest in, and probably
a greater knowledge of, these fields than did any of their
predecessors of this century.

CHAPTER V
THE NAVY'S PREPARATION FOR ITS ROLE
"Military advice, s.s an input to the solution of
international problems will only be valid if all the factors
which enter into the formulation of national policy have
been considered." With these words the President of the
United States Naval War College pressed his point in a 1962
letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel. The aim of the let-
ter was to convince the Chief of Naval Personnel to expand
the training being given naval officers in the field of
international relations. The Navy had already begun a pro-
gram to train some of its officers in this field; the let-
ter from the President of the War College sought to build on
the foundation of the existing program a larger one to meet
more effectively and fully the needs of the service and the
nation.
The importance attached to this effort by the Navy and
the reasoning supporting the Navy's programs in the field are
well presented in the .7a.r College President's letter:
In summary: Three basic points may be drawn from the
above (the basic text of the letter):
Enclosure to a letter from the President of the U.S.
Naval iiYar College to the Chief of Naval Personnel, dated




1, Those matters which most affect the security of
our nation are of a political-military nature, neither
purely military nor political.
£. These problems cannot be solved to best serve the
interest of our country if those who address them are
only versed in political or military matters,
5, ~.7hile the military man must, be chiefly competent
in military matters, he cannot, in all conscience, be
unversed in international affairs. To be so unversed is
to be unable to lend that constructive assistance to
which the President referred in his address (pertinent
portion quoted on page 2, supra). Furthermore, the more
the military man understands of the complexities of the
problems in the international level, the more able he
will be to play on the team with a minimum of friction
and a maximum of understanding.
Senior naval officers must be able to interpret and
equate international events to properly advise those
persons responsible for the development of national
policy and to further a sagacious translation of that
policy into the manifestations of national power. It is
most certainly in the best national interest to insure
that such interpretative ability and advice is contin-
ually available within the military. The assumption of
Free World leadership and the expansion of world-wide
commitments involving the military, point to an ever-
increasing need for such expertise. "^
It was pertinent to this study to examine what steps
the Navy had taken and ?/as taking to prepare its officers to
fulfill their responsibilities in the formulation of national
policy. This was done by addressing (1) the undergraduate
education of. naval officers, (2) their post-graduate educa-
tion in both civilian and military schools, (2) the designa-
tion system used to identify officers trained in this field,
and (4 J the opportunities available to officers to further
their understanding of the subject by working in the field





The Navy's officers come principally from four
sources; viz. , the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval Reserve
Officer Training Corps, the Officer Candidate School, and
in-service promotions from the enlisted ranks. The largest
single academic source of officers is the Naval Academy, It
will be addressed herein after the other sources have been
examined.
The Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) pro-
vides training for students at fifty-two of the nation's
colleges and universities. The students in the program are
commissioned as midshipmen in the Naval -Reserve during their
time in school. They may pursue almost any course of study
they desire—exceptions include art, music, and the minis-
try. Students are required to take a number of courses in
Naval Science to prepare for their duty in the Navy and are
required to maintain acceptable academic standards. It can
be seen rather readily that this program provides an input
to the officer corps of students of several of the academic
disciplines. Such academic diversity in the officer corps
has proven to be desirable and has provided the Navy a good
foundation on which to erect the sub-specialty concept,
which is discussed below.
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The Officer Candidate School receives most of its stu-
dents directly from civilian life. These men are required to
have a baccalaureate degree, but as in the case of the NROTC
the field in which the degree has been earned can come from
a large range. Consequently, the Officer Candidate School.
also provides academic diversity to the make-up of the offi-
cer corps.
Promotion from the enlisted ranks to commissioned
status does not require a baccalaureate degree. For these
officers--and others not holding degrees—the Navy provides
a program to encourage earning a degree. After the indi-
vidual has earned a minimum number of college credits en his
own, he is eligible for selection to the five term program,
which provides for full time college attendance to permit
completing the required work for a degree while in an active
duty status. Officers in this program, too, can select the
3
major field of study from a large variety.
It is apparent from the brief outline above that the
only sizeable segment of the Navy's officer corps that has a
similar educational background is comprised of graduates of
the Naval Academy, Accordingly, an examination of the curric-
ulum at the Naval Academy will provide an insight into the
^Bureau of Naval personnel, BuPers Instruction
1000. 7B (Washington, B.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Department of the Navy, I960), p. 1 of enclosure (2).
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undergraduate training given many officers in international
affairs and related subjects. It may also prove useful to
look very briefly into the philosophy that has underlain the
Navy's concept of the role of the Naval Academy
•
The Navy has moved more slowly than the Army in intro
ducing the study of international affairs at the under-
graduate level* As recently as the years between the world
wars, the Navy viewed the Naval Academy principally, and
very nearly exclusively, as a training area for preparing a
young officer for his first duties at sea. The overly sim-
plified explanation of this concept is to state that the
Academy's goal was to train rather than to educate, "* This
judgment is too harsh and does not give due regard to the
academic standards of the Naval Academy and the range of the
subjects taught. It does, however, indicate that the Navy
expected these officers to gain most of their understanding
of international affairs in post-gradua.te schooling after
leaving the Academy,
The curriculum at the Naval Academy has undergone
major revision in recent years, and the process does not
appear to be over. Though still offering less than the
other service academies in the field of international
4John ". Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers




affairs, the Naval Academy now requires each midshipman tc
study a foreign language for two years and offers four sin-
gle semester courses in the field, viz : European history,
U.S. diplomatic history, American government, and geography.
The diplomatic history course includes a brief analysis of
5international relations.
A student is often led into an interest in foreign
relations because of the interest placed by the Navy on his-
tory. Primary emphasis in the history taught in the first
year at the UrCOTC schools and later at the Academy is placed
on the llavy and its contributions to the national welfare.
The subject is used as a stimulant to the student's interest
in naval affairs. A collateral effect is often an awakening
of interest in foreign relations.
Morris Janowitz noted that another effect of an Acad-
emy education has been the inculcation of a. mechanical accep-
tance by the midshipmen of civilian supremacy over the mili-
tary. He concluded that officers who develop an interest in
international relations do so through higher educa.tion or
through their own inclinations rather than through the Stan-
Slbid ., p. 217.
6 Gene M, Lyons and John //. Mas land, Education and
Military Leadership (Princeton, II. J.: Princeton University





Naval officers receive post-graduate education in
both military and civilian institutions. Each of these types
of education have been offered to officers for many years,
but the emphasis on international relations is relatively
recent.
Post-graduate work in military institutions centers
on the various war colleges of the nation. The Navy, of
course, utilizes the United States Naval War College at New-
port, Rhode Island, for the bulk of its officers chosen for
war college education.
The U.S. Naval vYar College is the highest educational
institution of the Navy and the oldest institution of its
type in the world. It was founded in 1384 and had on its
first staff Captain Alfred T, Mahan, who was mentioned in
Chapter II, supra. Mahan became the second President of the
8
'.Var College, succeeding Commodore Stephen B, Luce.
In its early years the Naval War College concentrated
on fleet tactics and maneuvers—on the realm of combat now
'Morris Jan owit z, The Professi onal Soldier (Glencoe,
111.: The Free Press of i>lencoe, 1960), p. 133-139.
8U.S. Naval War College, Catalog of Courses , 1962-




categorized as "the battle." Little attention was given to
international relations and national policy. While Presi-
dent of the War College, Admiral W.V. Pratt attempted to
broaden the scope of the work offered but met with little
success. Emphasis continued to be put on tactical proce-
dures and doctrines, pointing toward successful fleet action.
Admiral Pratt has been quoted as saying that the Naval War




In 1944 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox appointed a
board to study the Navy's requirements in education for its
officers. 'This group, the Pye Board, submitted its report
later in the year and outlined several actions the Navy
should take. Although the Board did not recommend breaking
abruptly with the past practices of the Navy, it placed its
blessing on increased emphasis in the field of international
relations. It indicated that such work should remain subor-
dinate to the mastering of purely military subjects. Cit-
ing the need for appreciating the relationship between
national policy, international policy, and military force,
the Tye Board recommended the creation of a College of
National Defense that would serve all the services as well




. . p. 149.
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as the Departments of State, Commerce, and the Treasury.
Such an institution came into being v/ith the founding of the
National War College in 1946.
The events of the war end the degree to which mili-
tary officers were confronted with politico-military deci-
sions prompted a re-appraisal of the role to be filled by
the war colleges of the nation. The first post-war Presi-
dent of the Naval War College was Admiral Raymond Spruance,
This hero of the Pacific campaigns well appreciated the
necessity for re-evaluating the content of the course
offered at the war college. He rejected a narrow interpre-
tation of the college's role and began the broadening proc-
ess that was to culminate in a new approa.ch to war college
12
edtication within the ^avy.
It was during Admiral Spruance's administration tha.t
the first Foreign service officer was enrolled as a student
at the Kaval War College. Subsequently, a Foreign Service
officer ./as appointed to the staff of the war college.
Additionally, representatives from the State Department as
well as professional historians and political scientists
served as lecturers and guest speakers.
The major change in the curriculum of the Naval War
H-Ibid., p. 131. 12Ibid<, p. 153,
*8Ibid
. . p. 154.
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College came in 1953. Integral to the change in the curric-
ulum was a change in the role of the war college and the
method employed to fulfill that role. The President of the
War College in 1953 was Vice Admiral Richard Conolly. Under
his direction the course of study was changed from one year
to two years. The first year course contained the material
previously offered in the strategy and tactics course and in
the strategy and logistics course. This course provided a
solid basis in naval warfare advanced education for officers
14
in the gra.des of lieutenant commander and commander.
The big innovation v/3S the second, year course. This
was designed to provide insight into higher level strategy
on a national and international level. Students in this
course were to be officers in the gra.des of commander and
captain. Content of this course included political, eco-
nomic, and military aspects of national strategy, the formu-
lation of national policies, foreign area studies, and cur-
15
rent international affairs.
It should be understood that the introduction of a
two year course did not mean that students attended the war
college for two consecutive years. Typically, an officer
attends the first year of the course then returns to a sea
or staff assignment. Later in his career, he may return to
14Ibid., p. 155 1 5,1 bid.

9V
Newport for the second year of the course. Furthermore,
attendance at the first year course is not a prerequisite
for enrollment in the second year course. Thus, an officer
may undertake post-graduate work in a civilian institution
while a junior officer and then attend the final year of the
Naval War College course when he has attained the required
seniority.
Before the change of 195b the Navy's position had
been that the Naval «Var College would prepare officers for
naval warfare. The mission of preparing officers for work
in the field of high level national strategy was left to the
National War College. The move to a two year course
reflected a change in this approach, With this change, the
Navy offered a similar program in its senior course to those
offered by the National War College and the other services'
war colleges. This was not viewed as a fundamental change
in the role of the Naval War College. The mission remained
that of preparing officers for higher command. The change
illustrated rather the changing interpretation of the demands
of higher command upon the individual officer and provided
a basis on which an officer could develop the knowledge and
IfiJames L. Holloway, Jr., "The Holloway Plan—A Sum-
mary View and Commentary, " Unite d btates Naval Institute
Proceedings. 72:1295, November, 1947.
17Masland and Radway, ojd. cit
. . p, 355.
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ability necessary to make a meaningful contribution to
.. , ,. . . 18
national policy making.
The mission of the senior course at the Naval War
College today, as stated by the institution itself, is: "to
further an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare,
international relations, and inter-service operations, with
emphasis on their application to future naval warfare, in
19
order to prepare officers for higher command,"
It is also stated in the Catalog; of the Naval War
College that "It is essential for an officer in high command
to have a thorough understanding, not only of his own ser-
vice but also of the other military services and of the inter-
relations of the political, economic, socio-psychological and
military features of national power and their impact on mili-
tary strategy,
"
To accomplish its aims, the Naval War College devotes
a large pert of its effort to strategic studies. The major
part of the first term is devoted to "international relations,
factors influencing United States national objectives and
policy, the United States and the 5'ree tforid, the USSR and
18Iki£. , P. 156





the Soviet Bloc, and other strategic areas of interest, :t
In the second term students participate in a. strategic plan-
ning study. This part of the curriculum is described by the
Naval War College as follows:
By working in student staff organizations, they (the
students) first consider the conflicting aims of the U.S.
and the U.S.3.R., then translate national strategy devel-
oped in the fall term into national military stra.tegy,
and develop appropriate plans for the implementation of
this military strategy under conditions of cold, limited,
and general war.
This study culminates in a strategic war game in which
the student is able to test the validity of the national
strategy developed during the Strategy Study, and the
military strategic and plans developed in the Strategic
Planning Study. The strategic war game, a two-sided,
free maneuver, political-military game of global propor-
tions, is designed to encompass the entire spectrum of
conflict including cold, limited, and general war. 2
The Naval Warfare course concludes with the Global
Strategy Discussions, These discussions last for one week.
Participants include not only all the students of the course
but also senior military officers and prominent civilia.n
leaders from all branches of civilian endeavor. Global
Strategy Week, as the program is usually called at the /.Tar
College, began in 1949. Approximately one hundred fifty of
the participants come from outside the war college. The
civilians invited are the guests of the Secretary of the Navy
2*U.S. Naval War College, Supplement to Catalog: of
Courses, 1961-19 62 (Newport, xthode Island: U.S. Naval War
College, 1961), p. 2,
22Ibid .. p. 3.
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and include well known academecians, industrial leaders, pub-
lishers, and other prominent civilians. .Representatives of
23
the other services' war colleges also attend.
Global Strategy .Veek includes lectures by authorities
in the field, followed by question and answer periods. The
participants then divide into groups of fifteen to twenty
men each and conduct round table discussions. The results
and the conclusions reached ^oy these groups as well as sig-
nificant issues addressed but unresolved are compared at a
plenary session on the final day. The Naval SVar College
believes that "The Global Strategy Discussions are of great
mutual benefit to both the civilian and military participants
because they point up the mutual dependence of civilian and
military thought in the formulation of National Strategy and
the factors that affect the formulation of National Strat-
egy,"
Throughout the year, the Naval War College presents a
lecture program of visiting speakers to complement the
instruction provided by the staff of the war college. Visit-
ing lecturers include senior military and civilian officials
as well as distinguished members of the academic community.
In addition to the naval officers in the student body,
231-i^slni-sd and Kadway, on., c i t . , p. .337-530,
24U . S , Naval War College, Catalog , p . 19.
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the Naval War College also has students from the other mili-
tary services and from other departments of the government,
including the Department of State.
There is yet another course taught a.t the Naval War
College that has considerable but unassessable effect on the
educa.tion of the naval officer students. This is the Naval
Command Course for Senior Foreign Officers. The course,
which lasts for one year, has the objective of providing
foreign students with a knowledge of command a.t fleet level
and an understanding of naval warfare and weapons and of U.S.
concepts for their use. More germane to this paper, however,
is the recognition by the war college th-t the course pro-
vides its foreign students "an opportunity to increase their
appreciation for the role of sea power in guaranteeing Free
World security, and to increa.se their understanding of
international affairs, particularly in the field of politico-
military geography, international law, international organi-
zations and defense arrangements, world resources, and the
economic aspects 01 war.
Most of the foreign students, who come from all over
the Free World, bring their families with them to Newport
and live in the community. There is a great deal of contact
between the U.S. students and the foreign students, both dur-
SSlbid . , p. 24.

102
ing school hours and after. The degree to which this activity
"interna.tional-izes" the thinking of the U.S. officers cannot
be precisely measured; neither can it be denied that such an
effect is present.
The Naval .Var College is not the only higher education
military institution utilized by the Navy. Both the Army and
the Air Force operate war colleges, and naval officers attend
both. Their courses are comparable to the Naval far College
in the field of international relations. Predictably, their
analyses of warfare tend to concentrate upon combat involving
their own service's forces rather than naval forces.
In addition to the service war colleges, there are
three institutions of military education that are operated
jointly by the services. These are the National War College,
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed
Forces Staff College.
Joint sponsorship of military education began in June,
26
1943, with the establishment of the Army -Navy Staff College.
This school is not the direct predecessor of the present day
Armed Forces Staff College, but it did establish the precedent
for all joint education. General Henry H, Arnold, then Chief
of the Army Air Corps, is credited with initiating action
that led to the establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College.





General Arnold apparently believed his officers to be poorly
informed about the other services and. reasoned that the other
services' officers were probably equally ill-informed about
the nature of air warfare. He therefore proposed that some-
thing be done to correct the situation; General Marshall
and Admiral King readily agreed. The Army-Navy Staff College
was created with a mission to "train officers of all the arms
in the exercise of command and the performance of staff duties
27
in unified and coordinated Army and Wavy commands."
In November, 1945, the Army-Navy Staff College was
closed, and action began to establish its successor—an
institution to present a broader view to a wider audience.
Initially, plans had been made for establishing a National
Security University, which v/as to be comprised of separate
colleges serving the various departments. This concept was
not authorized for implementation, so the military services
proceeded with plans for a National 7/'ar College. The State
Lepartment v/as invited to participate in this college, both
on a staff a.nd student basis. The Secretary of State




27The National War College, Academic Year, 1961-1962
(Washington, D.C.: The National War College, 1962), p. 11,
28lbid .. p , 12-13*
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In the first years of its existence, the National War
College had classes of about one hundred. Occasionally,
there were also a few observers from Great Britain or Canada.
Presently, the classes number about one hundred thirty-four
each. There are no foreign observers. Three-quarters of the
students come from the military services. The remaining
quarter of the student body is drawn from the Department of
State, the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Defense,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency,
the National Security Agency, and the Department of Com-
29
merce.
The Commandant of the National War College is an offi-
cer of the military services of the rank of Vice Admiral or
Lieutenant General. He is supported by three deputy comman-
dants. Two of these are military officers (Rear Admiral/
Major General); the other, the Deputy Commandant for Foreign
Affairs, is a Foreign Service Officer with the rank of
Ambassador.
The mission and scope of the college are prescribed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The statement of the mission
includes, inter alia: M to enhance the preparation of
selected personnel of the armed forces and State Department
for the exercise of joint and combined high-level policy,
29
Ibid 8
, p t 13.
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command and staff functions and for the planning of national
30
strategy." Included in the scope of the curriculum is the
31
"study of the integration of military and foreign policy."
^n ^he Hole of the Military In American Foreign Pol i cy
Sapin and Snyder viev/ the National War College a.s "further
evidence of the Military Establishment's response to its new
32
role in the foreign policy field." Masland and Radway
note that the National War College devotes more attention to
33international relations than do the service war colleges.
The National War College curriculum is divided into
ten courses, as follows:
1. Introduction and World Situation
2. Factors of National Power
3. Formulation of U.S. National Security Policy
4. Strategy and Warfare
5. The Communist States
6. Free Europe and the Western Hemisphere
7. Africa and Free Asia
8. Field Studies; An Appraisal of National Secu-
rity
9. The Development of National Security Policy
10. The Development of National Strategy, Plans
and Programs. 34
These courses are taught by several academic proce-
S0Ibio\
, p. 14. 31ibid. , p. 15.
32 3urton M, Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of
the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y. :
boubleday & Company, Inc., 1954)", p. 64.
3SMasland and Hadway, op_. cit .. p. 360-361.
34T'he National Afar College, op_. cit . . p. 13.
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dures. The student is provided a list of readings in each
subject; daily discussion groups are held; student commit-
tees are assigned problems and attempt to develop responsive
papers and solutions; each student undertakes an individual
research paper, which is expected to be of the caliber of a
master's thesis. Perhaps the most important single proce-
dure employed is the guest lecturer program. The National
War College claims "the most distinguished list of guest
35
lecturers in the nation."
An examination of the guest lecturers at the school
bears out its claim. In a typical year, 1961-62, the guest
lecturers included: The Secretary of State, the Service
Secretaries, several Assistant Secretaries of Defense, then
Senator H.H. Humphrey, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Mr. Mc-
George Bundy, Mr. Dean Aeheson, Senator Margaret Chase Smith.
The academic community of the nation was well represented;
lecturers included the following deans and professors:
Robert Straus-Hupe, Hardy C. Dlllard, George B, Kistiakow-
sky, Ernest S, Griffith, Arnold C. 7/clfers, William Y,
Elliott, Edward L. Ka.tzenbach, and Bertram D. Wolfe. A
sprinkling of foreign dignitaries also graced the podium of
the National ffar College, lending a truly international air
to the students' efforts. The above is representative; it
36Ibid
. . p. 33.
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is neither complete nor does it provide necessarily the most
well-known and influential of the guest speakers. 6
Following the address of the guest, the floor is
opened for questions by the staff and students. All speakers
make their remarks off the record, so the students have an
unparalleled opportunity to hear explanations of the national
policy from the policy makers themselves and their most know-
ledgeable critics and supporters.
An integral part of the curriculum at the National War
College is the field trip taken by the students at the end of
the academic year. These trips include visits to foreign
nations and often result in the students' meeting and talk-
ing v/ith foreign leaders. Field trips in the past have
afforded the students the opportunity to meet with Indonesian
President Sukarno, Mr. Tom M'boya of Kenya, Prime Minister
£57Nehru of India, and other prominent foreign leaders.
The splendid education provided by the National War
College has been fully recognized by the Navy. Assignment
to the National IflTar College is eagerly sought cy naval offi-
cers. An extraordinarily high percentage of National Wa-r
College graduates have been selected for flag rank. Of the
line officers in the grade of admiral, vice admiral, and
rear admiral on active duty on January 1, 1964, one-third





were graduates of the National War College. Only a slightly
larger number of the flag officers (37,4$) were graduates of
the Naval War College senior course despite the much larger
38
number of naval officers attending the Naval War College.
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is the
third senior educational institution utilized by the Navy
in preparing its officers for important command, staff, and
policy making positions in the national and international
security structure* The Industrial College came under the
jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Hay, 1948. The
charter issued by the Joint Chiefs to the school four months
later placed it on the same level in service education as the
National far College and the services' senior schools. ^
The scope of studies at the Industrial College include;
"orientation in the broad aspects of na.tional and world eco-
nomic, political, and social conditions and trends.
. . .
study and analysis of the structure and operations of the
Department of Defense.
. . .
study of the organization and
processes for determining total requirements for national
38Bureau of Naval Personnel, Register of Commissioned
and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and Marine
Corps and. f-e serve Officers on Active Duty , 1_ January 1964
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of
the Navy, 1964), p. r, 1-3.
&




security." As this excerpt from the general information
booklet of the college indicates, the curriculum covers much
of the same material as does that of the National War College
Superficially, the similarities are great. A closer examina-
tion reveals, however, that the two schools have quite a
different approach to educating their student bodies. For
purposes of comparison, it may be stated that the National
War College produces a military strategist with a political
background while the Industrial College's graduate is a mili-
tary strategist with an economics background. This compari-
son is overly simplified, but it describes in broad terms the
basic difference between the schools.
Students at the Industrial College devote the majority
of their time to subjects such as management principles and
concepts, materiel management, economic capabilities, and
human and natural resources.'' The curriculum is definitely
related to foreign policy and international relations but not
so directly as is that of the National War College.
The teaching methods and procedures of the two schools
are similar. At the Industrial College, like the National
4=0 In dust-rial College of the Armed Forces, Curriculum
QUA General Information , 19 62-1 9 6b (Washington, D.C.: Indu:
trial College of the Armed Forces, 1962), p. 3.
41 Ibid .. p. 6-10.
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War College, committees are used extensively to study prob-
lems; lectures and seminars are supplemented by field trips
and guest speakers; and each student delivers an oral presen-
tation to the entire class and writes a thesis.
The graduates of the Industrial College have not been
as successful in attaining flag rank as have the graduates of
the National War College. Nevertheless, thirteen graduates
were wearing admiral's stars in 1964, accounting for six per-
48
cent of the line a.dmirals in the Navy.
The junior member of the triad of joint service schools
under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the
Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia. This school
has a student body comprised for the most part of officers in
the grade of lieutenant commander or major. The school
tea.ches the principles of staff work and prepares officers for
assignment to major staffs. Most of the time at the school is
spent in mastering the procedures for preparing military plans.
There is, however, a segment of the course at the Armed
Forces Staff College that serves to prepare an officer for
participation in the policy making process. This section of
the curriculum constitutes about one-sixth of the school's
instructional time and "provides an opportunity for study of
unresolved issues and future prospects, including those pro-
^Bureau of Naval Personnel, Register , p. x, 1-3,

Ill
dueed by new politico-military arrangements,"^ The final
fifteen hours of summary discussion at the school emphasize
the interdependence of political and military factors.
A less v/idely used but important aspect of officer
training for international security policy making is the
practice of sending U.S. officers to foreign service schools.
This exchange of students has been most frequent between the
United States and Great Britain. A sizeable number of Ameri-
can officers have attended the Imperial Defence College and,
indeed, one admiral is a graduate. Tv/o U.S. Navy admirals
are graduates of the Canadian National Defence College.
Other naval officers have attended the United Kingdom Joint
Services Staff College, the NATO Defense College, the Span-
ish Naval War College, the German General Staff College, the
Hoyal Air Force Staff College, the French Naval War College,
44
and the -rtoyal Naval Staff College. It appears obvious that
an American officer graduating from any of these colleges
will return home with a keener appreciation of foreign prob-
lems and affairs and will be better equipped to contribute
to his own nation's foreign policy making.
Comparison of the present curriculum at the service
colleges with those of twenty -five years ago reveals that
4
^Maslaod and Radway, gji. c i t . , p. 313.
^^Bureau of Naval Personnel, Register , p. x, 1-3,
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much greater attention is being paid to foreign policy and
international relations. This fact receives further empha-
sis from the large amount of politico-military material in
the curricula, of the joint colleges. From this situation an
interesting issue arises. Have the military schools over-
reached in their efforts to prepare officers for participa-
tion in the policy making process? The military apparently
does not believe so. Morris Janowitz notes:
There is no concern (among military educators) that
the new type of education might contribute to fashioning
a generation of highly political colonels who v/ill be
ill at ease with the traditions of civilian political
control. un the contrary, the informal curriculum of the
three service war colleges is geared to the notion that
the professional soldier must be fully equipped to pre-
sent vigorously to the public and to opinion leaders—in
and out of government--his service's point of view on
budget matters and on military policy. 45
It appears that the issue raised by Janowitz answers
itself. If, as is now the case, the advice and counsel of
military leaders is needed in the formulation of the nation s
foreign policy, then these leaders must be informed. Their
range of knowledge cannot be limited to the purely military
aspects of the problem. Broad and detailed knowledge on the
firing rate of weapons, the speed and capacity of ships, and
the rate of climb of aircraft have little direct application
in matters of national security policy. If the military





to some extent of the background behind the questions he is
asked. He must understand the workings of the national policy
structure, the goals of the nation's foreign policy, and the
primary obstacles to achieving them. Only in this way can he
provide adequate, usable military advice. As yet, there is
no indication that the "new type of education" is producing
a generation of highly political colonels or captains. If
such indications should arise, then the problem must be
addressed--but the answer to the problem cannot be an effort
to keep the military leaders ignorant of international
affairs.
In common with the other services--a.nd to a somewhat
greater degree than they—the Navy has relied on civilian
universities as a training ground for its officers, Naval
officers were not a. rarity on civilian campuses prior to
World 7vrar II. Today, there are more officers than ever work-
ing on a full or part time basis for an advanced degree from
a civilian institution.
A large number of the officers so employed are
assigned to post-graduate by the service. While attending
school, such officers are on active duty receiving full pay
and allowances. The bulk of their school expenses are borne
by the Navy,
Compared to the other disciplines, the study of poli-
tical science and international relations by naval officers
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had a late start. Admiral Robert Carney, while Chief of
Naval Operations, declared in 1953 that there was an urgent
need for greater knowledge of international affairs within
the Navy.
~
6 The first reaction to this growing belief in
the Navy was the inclusion in the curriculum of the Navy's
General Line School of a brief treatment of the present role
of the United States in world affairs a.nd the functions of
47
the Departments of State and Defense. This was followed
by the initiation of the political science post-graduate
education program in civilian universities.
Two Navy commanders were assigned to the Fletcher
School of Lav: and Diplomacy in 1956 to pursue a study of poli-
48
tical science. This marked the beginning of what has
become one of the most sought-after programs in the Navy's
post-graduate education program. After completing the two
year program of study, these two officers reported for duty
in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and were
assigned to the Politico -Military Division. Such an assign-
ment is considered highly desirable, and the developing
career patterns of these two officers made a further contri-
bution to the high level of interest in this program.
The course offered at the Fletcher School was for two
46Ma si and and Radway, od. clt
. . p. 154,
47Ibid., p. 280. 48Ibid .. p. 304.
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years. The second class, which contained three officers,
began the course of study in 1957. The following year a.
naval officer was sent for post-graduate political science
work to Stanford University; at the same time, two more
officers were ordered to the Fletcher School. This two year
program, labelled the "Political Science PG" by the Navy,
49
has continued at both of these schools.
The success of the two year program and the increas-
ingly recognized need for officers trained in this field led
to the establishment of an additional program in 1960. This
new program, the International Relations PG-, provided selected
officers a one year course of study at The American University
or at Harvard University. Ten officers were selected for this
program in 1960. In the years since then, the number of offi-
cers in the program has increased. The University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley became a participating institution in this
program in 1961. Officers assigned to this program spend one
year in post-graduate work and upon successful completion of
the course receive a. master's degree. The keen interest of
the officer corps in this program and the intense competition
for selection for it are highlighted by the fact that less
than five percent of the officers eligible for the program on
Obtained from, study of various letters, memoranda,
records, end files in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washing-





the basis of rank and academic background can be selected
because cf numerical limitations.
The success of the graduates of these programs in
major staff assignments and the relatively late start the
Navy made in this field dictated a need for short-range
stop-gap action in the early nineteen-sixties. At that time,
Navy captains, who are rarely selected for civilian post-
graduate schooling, were chosen to attend the one year course.
The plans of the Bureau of Naval Personnel were to continue
this procedure until a. supply of trained officers of appro-
priate seniority had been developed,
As a follow-on action to the two programs just dis-
cussed, the Navy instituted a smaller program that provided
for officers to continue post-graduate v/ork in these fields.
The aim of these students would be to earn the doctor's
degree. The Navy's purpose in developing this program w3s to
provide a small number of officers with a deeper understand-
ing of international relations. The obvious inference to be
drawn is that such officers would be assigned to major staff
billets requiring a sound background in international rela-
tions.
The growth of these programs in a short time is demon-
strated by comparing the enrollment figures for 1956, 1962 ;
and 1963, In 1956 only two naval officers were enrolled in
post-graduate courses in political science and international
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relations. These two commanders comprised merely a fraction
of one percent of the naval officers in advanced education
programs that year. By 1962 the figure had grown to thirty-
five officers, comprising approximately three and one-half
percent of the naval officers receiving advanced education
and about twelve percent of those' in civilian institutions.
The following year the number of naval officers in the pro-
grams had increased to fifty-nine and accoimted for four
percent of the officers receiving advanced education. In
that year, 1962, one of every six naval officers ordered to
a civilian institution for advanced work v/as a participant in
one of the programs discussed herein.
By paying a portion of the costs, the Navy has also
encouraged officers to continue advanced education outside
the formal, Navy-sponsored post-graduate program. The
Tuition Aid Program of the Navy provides that personnel pur-
suing work leading to a graduate degree may receive financial
assistance from the service. The graduate degree must be in
one of the following fields: education, engineering, inter-
national relations, management, mass communications, mathe-
matics, cr physical science. If the applicant meets very
basic requirements, the service will pay three-quarters of
the tuition cost. J
50Bureau of Naval Personnel, BuPers Instruction
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Through the Tuition Aid Program, numerous Navy men
have advanced their levels of education. Personnel are
actively encouraged to enroll in courses when duty assign-
ments permit, The .vashington, D.C., area provides an excel-
lent example of this program in action. The demand for
both undergraduate a.nd graduate level classes has been so
great among military personnel that evening classes are reg-
ularly conducted in the Pentagon.
By yet another means does the Navy provide education
to its widely-dispersed members--correspondence courses.
This teaching and testing method has enjoyed wide usage in
the Navy. Enlisted and officer training courses are provided
by the Naval Correspondence School. At one time officers
were required to complete successfully a prescribed series of
courses or face rigorous written examinations in qualifying
for promotion.
The type of course of primary interest, however, is
provided by the U.S. Naval War College. Seven gra.duate level
courses are offered by the school; four of these are directly
applicable to the Navy's efforts to prepare its officers for
roles in the making of national policy. Examinations are not
given to students taking the extension courses nor are grades
1530. IOC ('.Vashington, D.C. : Bureau, of Naval Personnel, Depart-
ment of the Navy, 1962), p. 2-3,
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assigned, The solutions proposed by the students are eval-
uated individually as acceptable or unacceptable. The latter
are returned for resubmission.
The extension courses offered by the Naval War College
of interest here include National and International Security
Organisation, Strategic Planning, International Law, and
International Relations. Heading courses in International
Law and International Relations are available in addition to
51the czten:;icn courses.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel distributes annually to
all ships and stations a list of books and articles recom-
mended for reading. The list is prepared by the staff of the
Naval War College. This service permits officers whose
assignments place them outside the mainstream of policy mat-
ters to keep abreast of developments . In this way, upon
their return to staff assignments, the officers who have
kept up with current thinking and problems will have less
ground to make vp as they strive to contribute to policy
making.
The interruptions that sea duty impose on officers 1
participation in policy making (and, indeed, many officers
would view this in reverse) make it necessary that there be
a method for officers to keep aware of national and inter-
51U.3* Naval War College, Catalog, p. 27-32
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national developments. In addition to the availability of
the news media, the Bureau of Personnel reading list fills a
real need.
Every ship and station in the Navy has a library.
Some of these are, of course, quite small; others are on a.
par with a small public library; a few are quite large. A
ship's libra.ry receives a Quarterly supplement of books from
the .bureau of Naval Personnel. These books are selected to
meet the requirements of the widely disparate tastes of a
ship's library's users. There are always at least a few
books in each quarterly shipment that deal with international
relations or national policy making in some way. Judicious
attention to the receipt of new books enables many officers
on sea duty to broaden their knowledge in these fields.
III. DESIGNATION OF OFFICERS
Through all of the measures discussed above, the Navy
has obtained or developed a sizeable number of officers with
a working knowledge of international relations, foreign policy,
national security policy, and political science. Figures
available in the files of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in
1962 showed that the Navy's officer corps contained officers
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Notes: ^'Eighteen of these officers have
at least fifteen hours credit in their work
toward a master's degree.
**Thirty-seven of these officers
have at least fifteen hours credit in their
work toward a master's degree.
In an organization as large as the Navy and faced
with the wide range of requirements the Navy has, a system is
required to insure that officers trained in a given field are
assigned to billets utilizing their knowledge. Similarly, it
is necessary to identify billets that require officers with
special training and skills. This problem is complicated for
the Navy because the primary specialty of every line officer
must be command st sea. Expecting an officer to master even
minimally the demands of a wide range of disciplines in
addition to his primary responsibility is recognized by the
Navy as unrealistic. According, the Navy has introduced the
sub-specialty concept in recent years. This concept is
designed to cope with this problem.
In essence, the sub-specialty concept provides that
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officers retain as primary in their training, education, and
efforts the goal of increasing their ability to command forces
at sea. This priority applies to all unrestricted line offi-
cers. An officer may also develop a sub-specialty, and vari-
ous avenues are open to officers attempting to do so. The
most frequently used path leading to designation as a sub-
specialist is post-graduate educa.tion followed by assignment
to a. billet in which that training is used.
When an officer has achieved sufficient knowledge and
experience in the field of his sub-specialty, his personnel
record will indicate that he is qualified in that sub-
specialty. Typically, a. graduate degree and a tour of duty
in a. related billet are required before an officer is con-
sidered qualified as a sub-specialist.
One of the sub-specialities used by the Navy is
"International Affairs Officer." According to the Manual of
I^aval Officer Billet Classification, an officer with this
sub-specialty "advises and assists in pla.nning and imple-
mentation of' policy with respect to naval aspects of inter-
national affairs; provides background information and
studies in international developments relating to the Navy;
serves as Navy representative in foreign surveys and proj-
ects;
. 6 . maintains liaison with other branches of the




cerned with international affairs.""
IV. DESIGNATION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENTS
As already mentioned, the billets requiring a sub-
specialist are also identified, A bo^rd in the Burea.ii of
Naval Personnel determines which billets require such identi-
fication. Their decisions are based on recommendations from
the parent organizations of the billets. The following
excerpt from a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations
illustrates the procedure while at the same time addressing
the importance of training in international relations to the
Politico -Military Division of the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations:
The experience of this division (Politico-Military)
has indicated that such training (post-gradus.te study in
international relations) is imperative in order to pro-
vide the Chief of Naval Operations with adequate staff
support in the increasingly demanding area, of inter-
national relations. ^
In response to this letter five billets in the division
54
were identified as requiring sub-specialists. Subsequently,
6 2Bureau of Naval Personnel, Manual of. Naval Officer
Billet Classifica tion s (Washington, D.C. : Bureau of Naval
Personnel, Department of the Navy, 1954),
^Letter from Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of
Naval Personnel, 0P614/djb, Ser 1557PS1, 7 February 1961,
on file in the Bureau of Naval Personnel,
54
Internal BuPers Memorandum, Pers A521 to Pers A114,
on file in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
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three additional billets in the division were also so desig-
nated.
Throughout the Navy, a great deal of training is done
on-the-job. This is true, of course, in policy making billets
as in any others. An officer assigned to a. billet that
reouires him to make contributions to policy will surely
leave the billet wiser and more experienced than he v/as on his
arrival. This fact should be borne in mind when considering
the next chapter. Throughout the process of contributing to
policy formulation, naval officers are individually gaining
a. greater amount of related knowledge and expertise. Morris
Janowitz notes that in 1950 almost one senior naval officer
in four had been assigned to such a billet at some point dur-
., 56log his career.
V. SUMMARY
In sum, no single method or system is used by the Navy
to train its officers in international relations. There is
no "school solution," A combination of undergraduate, grad-
uate, service college, joint college, and foreign service war
college education is blended with experience and buttressed
&5lnternal OPNAV Memorandum, 0P-09B21 Memo of 14 June
1961, on file in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
56Janowitz, on. cit . . p. 16 7.
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with reading courses, correspondence courses, and recommended
readings to provide naval officers with an understanding of
international relations and foreign policy, In concert these
methods have produced naval officers with sufficiently broad
understanding of the field to permit them to contribute mean-





In the years since World War II, naval officers have
continued to make solid contributions to the policy making
process. Admiral Leahy served as chief -of -staff (his own
term) to the President for some time after the war; there
can be little doubt that he provided advice a.nd guidance to
policy makers at the highest level. Two naval officers have
served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Although this is not a policy making agency, its daily brief-
ings to the chief executive provide a- forum for directing
attention to areas of interest.
After retiring from active duty, Admiral Alan 0, Kirk
1
twice served as an ambassador. Admiral George Anderson
retired as the Chief of Naval Operations in 1964 and immedi-
ately accepted appointment as the United vStates Ambassador
to Portugal.
I. EXAMPLES 0? NAVY PARTICIPATION
In addition to the individuals mentioned above, there
Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In," Harper 's
^J15MXl±> 195:482, December, 1947.
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have been numerous events since World War II in which the
Navy's contribution to foreign policy can be seen --or at
least .surmised. One of the problems associated with a study
of this subject is that a grea.t deal—in fact, a majority—of
illustrative examples of the Navy's contributions cannot be
divulged because of security classifications and requirements.
The role of the Navy in such instances must be surmised or
determined on the basis of reports from presumably informed
sources.
Hanson Baldwin reports that the policy of the United
States regarding the former Japa.nese mandated isla.nds was
2definitely the product of military influence. Sapin and
Snyder are even more specific, stating that the Navy Depart-
ment was a "vigorous and strong-willed participant in the
intragovernmental negotiations" regarding the disposition of
those islands held by Japan on mandate from the League of
Nations.
It has also been pointed out by Mr. Baldwin that
military strength was a requirement for implementing both
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Pl3n. It can, there-
fore., be inferred that military influence in policy making
2
I bid.
Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of
ilk?. Military i_n American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.
:
Doubieday & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 33.'
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^Burton M. Sapin and Bichard C, Snyder, The Kole of
the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.
:
Boubleday & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 33.
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helped to shape these policies.
*
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not purely
a military pact, but during the early years of its life it
functioned primarily as such. Daniel S. Cheever and H, Field
Javiland Jr. report that a delegation of American Army, Navy,
and Air Force officers, headed by Major General Lyman Lemnit-
zer (later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and subse-
quently Allied Commander in Europe) was sent to Europe to
study the problem of re-building a credible defense in NATO
5
Europe. The conclusions of these officers had considerable
impact on American foreign policy, especially in the field of
military assistance and foreign aid. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.
points out the magnitude of the Military Assistance Program,
and the inescapable interweaving of aid policy and foreign
policy emerges from his analysis.
Following the Korean War, direct diplomatic negotia-
tions for ending the fighting were conducted between repre-
sentatives of North Korea a,nd the United Na.tions. The dele-
gation of the United Nations was comprised entirely of raili-
*Baldwin, op. eit., p. 483.
^Daniel S, Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., Ameri -
can Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 126,
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Some Perspe ctives on American
Mili tary Assistance, Memorandum Number Thirteen (Princeton,




tary men; all but one were Americans. Admiral Turner Joy
of the United States Navy played a. prominent role in this
international parlay.
In July, 1951, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of
Naval Operations, began exploratory discussions with the
Spanish government regarding bases in Spain for American
forces. This was the beginning of a major change in policy
toward Spain, In 1952 negotiations began between the two
nations, conducted in large part by the United States mili-
tary mission. In September, 1955, an agreement was signed
by the United States and Spain, giving the United States
ba.se rights to certain air and naval bases in Spain in
exchange for a substantial amount of military and economic
aid. This agreement marked a dramatic change in direction
for United States policy. Many sources , including Sapin and
Snyder, credit the impact of military influences with effect.
9ing this change.
These examples should serve to illustrate that mili-
tary men, specifically naval officers, have continued since
World War II to make contributions to the formulation of
foreign policy. In this chapter an effort will be made to
determine how such contributions are made--through which
'Sapin and Snyder, p_p_. cit . , p, 50,
8Ibid
., p, 53. Slbid,
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channels? by which naval officers? to whom?
II. THE NAVAL OFFICERS INVOLVED
At some point in his service, virtually every profes-
sional officer has an opportunity to contribute to the policy
making process. This contribution may be made directly, in
the form of a staff solution to a. problem, or indirectly, in
the form of influence exerted on a present or future policy
ma.ker
.
In roost instances the key to an officer's opportunity
for contributing to policy is the organization and ballet to
which he is assigned. Some billets obviously are totally
removed from the realm of policy making; others are directly
in the mainstream. Typically, the more senior an officer
becomes, the greater is the likelihood that he will be a part
of the policy making apparatus. Supporting this contention
are these statements oy Morris Janowitz, "While every mili-
tary task ultimately impinges on international politics, some
officers have tasks which involve direct political planning
and political negotiation" and "Every ranking field officer
stationed abroa.d is, by virtue of his very position, a poli-
, - , . „ 1tie ol agenx,
"
Morris Janowitz, The Profess ional Soldier (Glencoe,
111: The Free Press of Glencoe, i960), p. 70.
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A survey conducted by John W, Ma.sland and Laurence I.
Hadv/ay indicated that approximately seventeen percent of all
admirals were assigned to interservice or international
agencies or to other departments of the federal government.
In the grade of captain about eleven of the officers were
serving in such assignments. Janowitz, noting these
results, points out tha.t "As warfare becomes more technolo-
gical, the number of military command assignments decreases
while 'military management 1 and politico-military assignments
..12increase.
"
Among the numerous channels through which naval offi-
cers make an input to foreign policy formulation, the Depart-
ment of Defense is the most prominent. It is clearly recog-
nized in the Defense Department a.nd in the individual ser-
vices that the Department of State has primary responsibility
for making foreign policy. It is equally well recognized
that policy makers need military a.dvice. And, on occasion,
foreign policy must be so oriented as to make its primary
objective the securing of military or naval advantages for
the nation. In such instances military advice becomes all
the more important. It is probably accurate to assume that
**John w. Maslaud and Laurence I. Kadway, Soldiers
and Scholars (Princeton, W.J.: Princeton University Press,
1957); p. '"516.
1 ? Janov.itz, loc. cit .
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in some instances the requirements of the military establish
the goals of policy. Accordingly, the position of the Depart.
ment of Defense on foreign policy matters has a. significant
impact on the policy developed.
III. THE SEGBETARY OF DEFENSE
The most powerful policy maker in the Defense Depart-
ment is, of course, the Secretary of Defense. In the years
before Secretary McNamara took office, such a statement vrould
have been open to discussion and probably dispute. The Secre.
tary of Defense has always had a strong voice, but so did the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs them-
selves. They still do, but there is no question that Secre-
tary McNamara's position is most likely to be the prevailing
3 3
one if differences of opinion exist within the Department,
l^It is interesting to note the evaluation made by
Korris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier, p. 355-356, in
considering the pre-McNamara situation: "The type of civi-
lians appointed in recent years to the top levels of the
military establishment tends to define their task as a form
of industrial management. They are only reluctantly drawn
into the implications of the political dimensions of day-to-
day military operations. . . . Professional officers have
thus come to ca.rry the burden of administering the politico-
military responsibilities of the arm^d forces," Even if this
view was accurate in 1960, which is debata.ble, it no longer
applies accurately to the Department of Defense. The Depart-
ment is not so monolithic that contributions to policy can-
not be made without going through the Secretary of Defense.
They can be and they are, but such contributions are excep-
tions to the rule.
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IV. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FUR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Most of the Secretary's staff support in the field of
politico -military affairs comes from the Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(OASD/ISA). This organization is the evolved product of a
special consultant en politico-military matters appointed by
the Secretary of Defense in 1949. The status of that office
was increased by a Presidential directive in 1950; and,
later, as a. result of the reorganization of 1953, the post of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
14
Affairs was created.
The responsibilities of this office are far-ra.nging.
It has been referred to as the little State Department of the
Pentagon. Indeed, most of the problems addressed in this
office are also studied by State Department officers; a
great de3l of cooperation and coordination between State and
OASD/ISA is required and apparently exists.
In the early years of its existence, OASD/ISA focused
primarily on the foreign military assistance program and
*^Arthur '1 . MacMahon, Admini stration in Foreign
Aff sirs (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press,
1953), p. 180-181; and
Brookings Institute, The, Administration of Foreign
Affairs and Overseas Operations [Washington, D.C. : The
.Brookings Institute, 1951/, p. 123.
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policies relating thereto. The post of Director of Military
Assistance was created to provide staff support to the Assis-
tant Secretary for International Security Affairs. Initially
the post was filled by an officer of four star ra.nk, Army
General vYilliston B. Palmer, who had sufficient rank and
seniority to deal directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
OASD/ISA. Subsequently, the post has been filled by a three
star officer; the present director is Vice Admiral Luther C,
Heinz, United States Navy.
Staff support for the Director of Military Assistance
includes active duty naval officers. These men make a direct
contribution to national policy in their recommendations con-
cerning the military assistance program. The military assis-
tance program is a tool for achieving foreign policy objec-
tives; at the same time, its use and its limits establish
some of the boundaries within which policy objectives must be
developed.
Serving under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs are seven civilian deputy
assistant secretaries. Their offices focus on the following
areas: European and NATO Affairs; Far Eastern Affairs;
Africa, Latin America, and Foreign Military Kights; Near
Eastern and Southern Asian Affairs and x^ilitary Assistance
Program Policy Review; Arms Control and Foreign Economic
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15Affairs; and International Logistics Negotiations. These
officials are supported by a staff of approximately forty-
five senior military officers and a number of civilian
. 16
experts.
The requirement for this large organization is appar-
ent v/hen the responsibilities of the 0A3D/ISA are considered.
This office helps the Secretary of Defense formulate the
department's position on United Nation affairs, National
Security Council actions, inter-governmental negotiations,
17
and similar politico-military matters. Indeed, many of the
positions of the Defense Department on highly important issues
are determined by this office and implemented without specific
1 ft
reference to the Secretary, °
The other Assistant Secretaries of Defense have naval
officers on their staffs. To the degree that the other Assis-
tant Secretaries are brought into the policy making process,
the naval officers in their organizations have an opportunity
to contribute to the formulation of policy. In the main,
however, the greatest contributions by naval officers in the
^Department of Defense, Telephone Directory (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p, C-8.
l^Masland and Radway, o_p_. cit
. , p. 514.
*'Sapin and Snyder, cro. cit
. , p. 26.
l^Paul y, Hammond, Organizin g; For Defense {Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 253.
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Office of the Seci^etary of Defense are made by those serving
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs.
V. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The most influential military officer in the field of
policy formulation is the Chairma.n of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, This officer commands none of the services directly
but acts precisely as his title indicates-~-as Chairman of the
corporate body known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His posi-
tion gives him considerable influence as well as access to
the highest levels in the national government.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be a
member of any of the services. To date, one Navy officer,
one Air Force officer, and four Army generals have filled
the position s The Chairman regularly attends meetings of the
National Security Council and frequently testifies before the
Congress. His position, responsibilities, and military
expertise combine to make him an influential force in the
formulation of foreign policy.
VI. THE JOINT STAFF
Staff support for the Chairma.n and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff comes from the Joint Staff and the Organization cf
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The distinction between the Joint
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Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
primarily an administrative one. The statutory numerical
limitation on the Joint Staff has resulted in part of the
staff support for the Joint Chiefs being assigned to the
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than to the
Joint Staff, Their missions are basically the same, viz :
providing staff support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs.
The Joint Staff is organized into directorates for
personnel, operations, logistics, plans and policy, and comm-
unications. Any of these directorates might be involved in
policy making on a given problem, but the bulk of problems
dealing with politico -military matters are handled by the
J-5, the directorate for plans and policy. This directorate,
like all the Joint Staff and Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, is manned by representatives of all the services.
Naval officers and marines fill approximately one-third of all
billets in each directorate and agency. Action officers in
the Joint Staff are typically of commander or captain rank;
division directors and agency chiefs are flag or general
officers as are the directors of the Joint Staff directorates.
It may be informative to trace a. typical problem
through the staffing process in the Joint Staff in order to
illustrate the procedure through which decisions a.re made by
19 Department of Defense, op_. cit
. , p. C-9, C-10.
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problem requiring a decision
may come from a number of sources. In this example it is
assumed that the Secretary of State has requested from the
Secretary of Defense the position of the Defense Department
on a. matter with politico-military implications. The Secre-
tary of Defense, in turn, refers the problem to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations. (The Secretary
may, at the same time, refer the problem for study and
recommendation to a. part of his own staff, e.g. , OASD/ISA.
)
Within the Joint Staff the problem will be referred to one of
the directorates for development of a recommended Joint Chiefs
position. Other interested directorates are invited to comment
on the proposed position developed by the action officer. The
position is then submitted to the service staffs for comment
or concurrence. Finally, it is addressed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff themselves and the decision is sent to the Secretary
20
of Defense.
This illustration highlights the importance and influ-
ence of the action officer. He drafts the first paper pro-
posing a position for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although
his position is subject to modification by the service
planners, his seniors in the Joint Staff, and the Joint
Chiefs themselves, he has the advantage of proposing the
20Masland and Radway, op. cit,, p. 514-515.
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first solution. Those in disagreement with his solution are
then forced to propose a better one. Because of the volume
of problems facing the Joint Chiefs and service planners,
action officers are often more fully acquainted with the
details of specific problems than anyone else. They can,
therefore, present a strong case for accepting their proposed
solutions. Their seniors usually possess a bettor grasp of
all the broad range of problems confronting the nation and
can insure that the proposed position is compatible with the
overall national interest.
The Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs
serves as a, part of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. This flag or general officer is supported by staff
officers from each of the services. Liaison between this
office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs is required to insure the
fullest benefit for the national interest from the Military
Assistance Program.
Another part of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff that plays a part in the policy forming process is
the Joint .Var Games Agency (J7/GA). The Politico-Military
Division of this agency has been a pioneer in conducting
large scale politico-military games. As pointed out by
Lincoln P. Lloomfield, the primary advantage of politico-
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military gaming is the education afforded the participants.^ 1
Military and civilian personnel taking part in the elaborate
games of the J'A'GA have an excellent opportunity to gain new
insights into politico-military problems. These insights can
then be applied as they grapple with problems in the "real
world.
VII. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Even more than the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs them-
selves are involved in the policy making process. Their posi-
tions as heads of the individual services provide their pro-
nouncements with considerable influence—whether made jointly
or individually. The stature of the Joint Chiefs is well
recognized in foreign nations as well as in the United States.
"Though not engaging in formal diplomatic negotiations, mem-
bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high-ranking
military officers have had increasing opportunities in recent
years to talk to leading political as well as military figures
in other countries. . . . Visiting members of the Joint
Chiefs seem to go through the same round of conferences and
conversations in some countries as important Senators and




^Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Political Gaming," Unite d
States Naval Institute Proceedings , 86:57, S e p t emb er , 1960.
22-Japin and Snyder, od, cit . , p. 49.
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VIII. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
As the Navy's member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Chief of Naval Operations occupies an important position in
the machinery for making national policy. The necessity for
allowing the Chief of Naval Operations adequate time to pre-
pare himself for these responsibilities was recognized in the
reorganization of 1958. This authorized the delegation of
certain tasks and authority to the vice chief of the service,
thereby permitting the chief of the service to prepare more
fully and participate more actively in the policy making
process.
Staff support for the Chief of Naval Operations comes
from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which is
commonly abbreviated OPNAV. Divisions form the fundamental
organizational elements of OPNAV. Two of the divisions are
especially active in advising the Chief of Naval Operations
on matters relating to international affairs and politico-
military matters.
The first of these divisions is the Strategic Plans
Division (OP-60). One of the components of OP-60 is the
national policy section, This group of officers deals with
highly classified matters relating to national security and
are instrumental in developing the Navy's position on complex
problems in the field of international affairs.
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The Politico-Military Division (OP-61) has the primary
function of advising the Chief of Naval Operations on day-to-
day events in international political affairs with emphasis
33
on those relating to the Navy, c It should be emphasized
tha.t the title of this division relates only to international
politics; domestic politics are not addressed. OP-61 is
organized on a basis of geographic responsibility. Staff
officers work on problems from a. given geographic area, much
like the desk officers at the State Department,
The officers assigned to OP-61 are usually graduates
24
of the National fifar College or a senior service college.
Additionally, many of the graduates of the Navy's post-
graduate education program in international relations are
OK
subsequently assigned to this division, u
Other divisions throughout OPNAV are often involved in
problems v/ith international politico-military implications.
Prominent among these divisions are the Foreign Military
Assistance Division, the Pan-American Affairs Division, and
the Office of Naval Intelligence, Staff officers in each of
«Tohn McAuley, "The Navy's Hole in International
Affairs," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 77:16,
January, 1951. See also Masland and rtadway, p_p_, cit , t
p, 515; and, Sa.pin and Snyder, cro. cit . . p. 36,
24McAuley, loc, cit.
25This observation and several others that follow in
this chapter are based on personal knowledge of the author.
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these divisions have occasion to make contributions in deter-
mining the position of the Chief of Naval Operations on prob-
lems relating to international affairs.
This brief description of the workings of the Joint
Staff and the Navy Staff should not lead to the conclusion
that all of the work done by the staff officers involves
reacting to problems posed by others. The Chief of Naval
Operations can and does propose subjects for discussion by
the Joint Chiefs of Staffs and recommends courses of action
relating to them. Therefore, a staff officer on the Navy
Staff can propose to the Chief of Naval Operations a course
of action in an international situation. If the Chief of
Naval Operations agrees with the proposal, it can be brought
to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With their
concurrence the proposal can be sent to the Secretary of
Defense a.nd thence onward and upward in the policy making
machinery. An intelligent, aggressive staff officer has the
opportunity to make substantive contributions to the nation's
foreign policy.
IX. UNIFIED AND INTERNATIONAL COMYlANDSRS
Each of the unified commanders is supported by a joint
staff. There are, of course, naval officers en each of these
staffs. To the degree that the unified commander is involved
in the policy making process his staff officers have an
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opportunity to contribute to the formulation of policy. The
amount of influence exerted by a unified commander in the
policy making process is affected by many things. There can
be little doubt that Admiral U.S. Or. Sharp, the U.S. Navy
officer heading the Facific Command, has some voice in tho
determination of national policy in Southeast Asia. The
degree to which his recommendations are followed is not
known publicly at this time because of security restrictions,
Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that both Admiral Sharp
and his staff officers are making a contribution, of undeter-
mined magnitude, to the national policy.
The same opportunity, in greater or lesser degree, is
available to each of the unified commanders and the officers
of his staff. In this regard, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Atlantic Comma.nd (Admiral Thomas Koorer, U.S. Navy) a.nd the
United Sta.tes Commander-in-Chief of the European Comma.nd
(General Lyma.n Lsmnitzer, U.S. Army) have additional oppor-
tunities tc influence international affairs, Each of these
officers serves not only as the commander of a U.S. command
but also as a Supreme Allied Commander in NATO. In their
NATO assignments these officers head combined staffs, manned
by officers from all the NATO nations. Their influence on
policy in the treaty organization can only be inferred since
security restrictions again deny public access to the records.
It appears, however, that these commanders and their staffs,
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which include U.S. Navy officers, must exert some influence
on the policies of NATO. As Sapin and Snyder note, NATO's
central headquarters "is constantly engaged in what must be
called international military planning.
"
There are other international organizations in which
U.S. naval officers find an opportunity to contribute to the
furtherance of U.S. policy. In some instances, the officers
also have a hand in developing the policy they are charged
with implementing. Examples of these organizations include
the Inter American Defense Board, the Canadia.n-U. S. Planning
Group, the bodies consulting on defense matters concerning
the United States and Brazil and the United States and Mex-
ico, the Southeast Treaty Organization, ana, in an observer
status, the Central Treaty Organization,
There is also a military staff committee included in
the United States delegation to the United Nations, This
group is headed by an officer of three star rank. A naval
officer has held this post in the past, and other naval offi-
27
cers have served on the sta.ff.
Still more naval officers are assigned to duty as
naval attaches in U.S. embassies around the world. These
officers are charged with advising the U.S, Ambassador on
26sapin and Snyder, p_p_. cit . . p. 9.




naval matters relating to the host nation and the United
States. Navy members of the sta.ffs of Military Assistance
Advisory Groups and Missions also contribute to the policy
making machinery by the reports they submit to Washington.
X. INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES AND OPINION MOLDING
When the President chooses to use the National Security
Council as a primary organ for policy making, the Defense
Department is represented by the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff. As described earlier,
the positions and policies advocated by these men have often
been developed by their sta.ffs, which include naval officers.
MacMahon sees military participation in the National Security
Council as an "acknowledgment by the armed forces of the para-
mount nature of the political factors and at the same time a.
bid to participate in political decisions,"'
The Department of State itself has two Navy captains
assigned to it as action officers. In return, two Foreign
Service officers fill action officer billets in OPNAV,
usually in OP-50 snd GP-61. This program provides for cross-
pollination of ideas in addition to giving each organization
the benefit of the knowledge of officers from another depart-
ment.
28MacMahon, p_p_. cit . , p. 47.
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The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, as well as 0P~61 to a lesser
degree, maintains close liaison with the State Department,
This permits each department to be aware of and, perhaps, to
influence the policy decisions of the other.
Naval officers have opportunities to contribute
directly to policy making at the highest executive level,
The President is briefed and advised by the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, on
occasion, the Chief of Naval Operations. Once more, these
officials must rely on their staffs for thorough study of
major problems. And, once more, naval officers are assigned
to the staff of each of them.
In the legislative branch the influence of the Navy on
policy making is less continuous. During the annual budget
hearings, the Chief of Naval Operations testifies before Con-
gressional committees. His statements and responses to their
questions can often be useful to members of Congress when
faced with policy decisions.
In this regard, Sa.pin and Snyder note that "One of the
noteworthy aspects of the processes that characterize recent
American foreign policy decision-making is the use of members
of the Defense Establishment, both top civilian officials and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high-ranking military
officers, to testify in support of new foreign policy and
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programs and the continuance of ongoing ones before committees
of Congress." 29
There is another large area in which naval officers
exert influence on and make contributions to national policy.
This area cannot be even approximately measured, but its
potential is large. The area is that encompassed by the
effect of naval officers and their views on the nation's
opinion molders and policy makers. This effect exists, even
though it cannot be measured, in several places.
For example, naval officers at government educational
centers, such as the National ;Yar College, influence their
civilian colleagues to some degree. In the same way the non-
Navy students at the Naval War College may be influenced in
their opinions by naval officers as may those attending the
seminars on policy making conducted by the .State Department,
Naval officers attend both the State Department's four month
seminar and its twelve month seminar for senior officials.
Inter-departmental working groups, such as the State-
Defense Study Group, provide another arena in which the
opinions of naval officers can influence and be influenced by
their fellow members of the study group. In all such inter-
department and inter-agency groups the potential for advising,
informing, and influencing the other members of the group
d9 Sapin and Snyder, ojd. cit . . p. 46.

149
exists. It should be pointed out that the exertion of influ-
ence on the opinions of other members of such groups or com-
mittees is rarely done with a premeditated, ulterior motive.
It is, rather, a predictable, reasonable, and probably desir-
able result of officials from different departments working
together on a common problem.
Opinion molders, policy makers, and the public in
general may be affected in their convictions regarding inter-
national affairs by speeches they hear, A surprisingly large
number of requests are received by the Navy Department for
speakers at various events. Because of the number of requests
received, a sizeable number of speeches are made annually by
senior officers of the Navy. These speeches, and the conver-
sations that precede and follow them, provide a. large number
of people with a better understanding of the Navy's capabili-
ties, problems, and prospects. Since a part of the Navy's
work deals directly with international relations, some of the
speeches address this topic.
It would be unfair to say that the activities of the
Navy League in a.dvocating specific national policies are
examples of the Navy's influence in policy making. The Navy
League is a civilian organisation, entirely separate from the
service. On the other hand, in view of the mission cf the
Navy League, it would be naive to assume that the policies




In summary, although there is no naval officer with a
direct, statutory responsibility for formulating national
foreign policy, a large number of naval officers have a
direct or, more frequently, indirect effect on the national
policies. Sapin and Snyder summarized the situation well:
"The essential development to be stressed in discussing mili-
tary participation in the formulation of American foreign
policy is that the Military Establishment has become a part-
ner, a very important partner, of the State Department and
other relevant civilian agencies in these policy making
. . ... „30
activities,
"




Few subjects are designed to make the task of a
researcher an easy one. This paper provided examples of
some of the problems a researcher can face. In the first
place, most of the material with which this paper deals is
classified as security information. Accordingly, a
researcher preparing an unclassified paper must often skirt
the fringes of a central issue because he cannot obtain
access to or use of pertinent information.
Sapin and Snyder discussed another problem relating
to research of this subject, "Unfortunately, there is not
much detailed case material available from which could be
derived reasonably clear notions as to the nature of mili-
tary influence on policy substance: that is, those situa-
tions and those problems in which the values of the mili-
tary, their objectives, estimates of the situation and anal~
yses of policy alternatives, have tended to prove dominant, "*
National policy is developed in several ways, ranging
from a well structured, organizational position to an agree-
ment between government officials made quickly during a cri-
* Bur ton M, Sapin and Hi chard C. Snyder, The Hole of
the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, II. Y. :










sis without detailed staff study and support. Because of
this, it is not always possible to determine the genesis of
a policy and the factors thst influenced its development.
Even with these limitations, however, one can reach
conclusions regarding the role of the Navy in the develop--
merit of foreign policy and national security policy.
The change in the nature of the international society
and the degree of American participation in it have created
a greater requirement for military strength and for the con-
sideration of military factors in foreign policy. Accord-
ingly, it is reasonable to expect that the military sector
of the government would have greater contributions to make
to the policy formulation process. This appears to be the
case.
Changes that have caused this situation include the
objectives of our policy and the nature of the threat facing
the nation. Although national security v/as the foundation
on which policy was built for many years, it has now become
the goal toward which policy is directed. This means that-
military measures have achieved a relatively greater priority
than before since they are now directed toward preserving the
existence of the republic rather tha.n merely advancing inter-
ests that are not vital for survival.
The threat facing the nation, is different from any in
our history. The advocates of the communist ideology have
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at their disposal the means to initiate conflicts covering
the spectrum of conflict from an all-out massive nuclear
Armageddon through the so-called "wars of national libera-
tion" to diplomatic and economic pressures. This multi-
faceted threat has required that the United States possess
stronger and more flexible military forces than ever before.
To be effective, the use of these military forces must be
closely coordinated with the other actions of the government.
This has resulted in the military sector of the government
becoming more interested and involved in the actions of the
other parts of the government—and vice versa..
A logical outgrowth of the greater involvement of the
military can be seen in the number of military officers now
assigned to other agencies of the government. U.b. military
officers are now assigned to the State Department, the
Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and other governmental departments and agencies.
Changes in the nature of threat to the nation and in
the objectives of the national policy have also been reflec-
ted in the organizational structures of the services them-
selves. Beginning in the nineteen-forties, the staff of the
Chief of Naval Operations has included a Politico-Military
Division to inform, advise, and support the Navy ' s senior
officers.
The type and locations of its operations and responsi-
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bilities have always dictated that the Navy be aware of arid
responsive to the demands of national policy. In recent
years it has been necessary that this awareness be even more
closely attuned with that of other segments of the govern-
ment, that the Navy's responsiveness be even more closely
geared to the requirements of policy, and that the Navy under-
stand even better the factors influencing the policies it may
be called upon to implement. An obvious collary is that it
has become more and more desirable that policy makers know
very accurately how naval power can be used to advance the
national interest--in both peace and war.
Contributing to the development of foreign policy is
not a totally new role for the Navy, but the channels through
which the contributions are made h?ve changed remarkably in
recent years.
Before the twentieth century, naval officers in foreign
areas were often required both to formulate and then to imple-
ment the national policy, guided by their own understanding of
the national interest and very broad directives from the
national government. Thus, Commodore Matthew C. Perry forced
negotiations upon the Japanese, negotiations that have had a
major effect on international relations ever since.
As the ability of the government to communicate
rapidly with its distant officers improved, the necessity for
on-the-spot policy making declined. Accordingly, the Navy's
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contributions to policy making began to come from officers
at or near the seat of power. The work of Admiral A.T. Ma.han
must be recognized as an example of the Na.vy's contributions
to policy making and an important influence on American
policy at the turn of the century.
The shift toward the seat of government as the pri-
mary site of naval officers ' contributions to policy was
completed during the years of 7/orld War II. At the same
time, the degree of Navy participation in formulating the
national policy reached its zenith. Considering President
Roosevelt's practice of relying on his military leaders for
advice and counsel together with the fact that his military
"chief of staff" was a. naval officer, Admiral vY.D, Leahy, it
can be assumed that the Navy's contributions to policy were,
significant even though the policies advocated and accepted
cannot be determined specifically in all cases. Roosevelt's
failure to seek and accept the positions of the State Depart-
ment during this period increased the relative strength of
the policy proposals of the military leaders.
Following the death of President Roosevelt and the end
of World War II, the procedures for formulating national
policy underwent major changes. The work of Admiral Arthur
W. Radford and his contributions to policy making while the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be viewed as a
carry-over from the yer-rs of individual contributions to
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policy, for the years following World War II saw policy mak-
ing become a function of organizations more and more, of
individuals less and less.
The National Security Act of 1947 established a for-
mal, organizational structure for the formulation of national
policy. The place of the Navy in this structure was clear.
The Secretary of the Navy, as well as the Secretary of Defense,
served as a. statutory member of the National Security Council.
The Chief of Naval Operations had a major voice as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a voice not yet muted by the
appointment of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
With the enactment of the National Security Act of
1947, the contributions made by the Navy to the formulation
of national policy changed from primarily individual efforts
to organizational efforts. Policy became increasingly the
product of organization representatives working together in
the National Security Council and subordinate groups. Direct
and undiluted contributions by individuals comprised a much
smaller part of the nation's policy making.
In the years since 1947 the importance of the Navy
Department itself has diminished while the importance of the
Defense Department has increased. The Secretary of the Navy,
no longer a member of the National Security Council, and the
Chief of Naval Operations, now subordinate to the Chairman cf
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now appear to have less influence
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on the national policy than they did in the past. Acting
through the Department of Defense, however, they may now
have more influence than before. This comparison is subject
to so many variables and unknown factors that a precise eval-
uation is impossible. It is concluded here only that most of
the Navy's present contribution to national policy making is
channeled through the Department of Defense.
Heorganizations of the Defense Department in 1949,
1953, and 1958 have had impacts on the amount and method of
the Navy's work in formulating policy. The Congressional
authorization of a Joint Staff, and the subsequent increases
in its size, have tended to lessen the authority and influence
of the Navy staff. However, since approximately one -third of
the officers of the Joint Staff are naval officers, the over-
all result of the creation of the Joint Staff on the Navy's
role in policy making cannot be determined, In the first
place, it is virtually impossible to determine how much the
Joint Staff contributes to policy making. Even if this
could be done, the degree of Navy participation and influence
in developing a specific position is never made public
because of security restrictions and probably could not be
ascertained even without security restrictions,
Because the military now has a channel through which
all the services can speak with one voice, i.e. the Chairman
and the Joint Staff, the net result of unification may have
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been an increase in the military's role in policy making.
7/ithin this structure, however, it is impossible to isolate
fully the role of an individual service.
Within the Navy there has been an increasing amount
of attention and interest given to the subject of inter-
national relations and national security policy. In the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings the number of articles, lead
articles, and book reviews addressing the subject has
increased steadily since the turn of the century. The subject
is now one of those most discussed and studied by naval offi-
cers throughout the country and around the world.
The expenditures made by the Navy to prepare its offi-
cers for work in this field are large in terms of money and
manpower, A sizeable portion of the curriculum at the U.S.
Naval War College is devoted to international relations and
national security policy. Naval officers attending the other
senior service colleges receive similar instruction. Corres-
pondence courses are provided by the Navy in these subjects
and are widely used by officers in the fleet and ashore. A
significant part of the Navy's post-gradus te program in
civilian universities is devoted to the study of international
relations and political science.
It is good that this much effort is m^de to prepare
naval officers because a large number of them are assigned to
billets in which they are involved, either directly or
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indirectly, in policy making on a national and international
scale. A Chief Petty Officer assigned to the Politico-
Military Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions made a realistic evaluation of the Navy's role in
policy making in 1951. There have been many changes since
then, but Chief McAuley's remarks still describe well the way
a service position can influence policy making:
We are all aware that the Navy does not make foreign
policy. Foreign policy emanates from the National
Security Council, over which the President presides, and
the Department of State. But before a recommended policy
or action reaches the level necessary for approval, it
is accompanied by many so-called "slants" submitted by
various other departments and agencies concerned with the
subject. These slants may range from complete disapproval
to a recommendation for minor textual changes. It is
through the medium of these slants that each department
and agency, including the Navy Department, is afforded the
opportunity of interjecting its opinions and influence in
the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
The Navy's contributions to policy making today are
made largely through staff procedures, where action officers
strive to produce a position both responsive to the problem
and realistic to the circumstances. By the time a proposed
policy ha? been examined at several levels and by representa-
tives of several departments, it is to be expected that its
weaknesses ana inconsistencies will have been discovered and
eliminated.
p
John McAuley, "The Navy's Pole in International




The issue of whether or not the military should take
part in policy making has been answered affirmatively in a
study by the prestigious Brookings Institute, which con-
cludes :
The -Department of Defense should participate in the
formulation of foreign policy by furnishing military
a,dvice to the President end the Department of State,
taking economic and foreign policy implications into
account so far as feasible in developing its military
advice.^
In general terms this appears to be the present prac-
tice. Since 1945 there has been a continuing and successful
effort to make more effective the national policy making
machinery. The Navy has been an important part of this
effort and an important contributor to the process of formu-
lating the national policy. In view of the troubled inter-
national situation and the role of the United States as the
pre-eminent power in the Free World, it is probable, that the
Navy's role in formulating national policy will not lessen
in the years ahead.
It is appropriate that this final quote should have
been written by a naval officer. In a letter to Congressman
Clifton A. '.Toodrum, Chairman of the Committee on Postwar
Military Policy, Fleet Admiral '.Villiam F. Plalsey, United
^Sr cokings In s t i tu t e , The Administration of Foreign
Affairs a_r; d C verse?. s Operations ( Washington, D . C , : The




I have one more point to offer: the need for wise,
trained men to minister the National Policy. We need
men v/ho understand the fundamentals of our aims and
ideals, v/ho understand the interrelation of international
politics, internal politics, trade and finance, and the
true significance of military power. . . . We must find
and train such men--outstanding civilians v/ho have served
their country under arms and outstanding military men v/ho
have studied to understand the civil aspects of government
and international relations. If we don '
t
find and train
and employ such men in the service of the United States,
we will lost our shirts as we have in the past—and then
v/ha.t avails the sacrifice of life, blood, and treasure
that we h- ve made?-
"Letter from W.F. Halsey to C.A. Woo drum, in Walter
Mil lis (ed.) f The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking
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